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Tax Treaties and Tax Neutrality;
A Proposal Being Considered by Indonesia
Duncan E. Haynes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the abortive Communist coup in 1965, Indonesia has
placed primary reliance on private investment, both domestic and
foreign, to increase the productivity of its economy. These efforts
to reshape its economy have been successful in some respects.
Inflation has been reduced from an incredible 650% in 1966 to 9%
in 19701 and both foreign and domestic investments have in-
creased.2 Since the country's present per capital gross domestic
product is only approximately $100, 3 the amount of capital that
* Partner in the firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San
Francisco, California, and former Professor of Law, University of Minne-
sota.
1. See Sadli, Indonesian Investment Climate, at (ii), appearing
as the introduction to Consulate General of Indonesia, Foreign Invest-
ment in Indonesia (1971) (Copy on file at MINN. L. REv.). The same
article also appears in 26 FAR EAST TRADE A m DEVELOPMU4rr No. 5,
184-86 (May 1971). Dr. Sadli is the Chairman of Indonesia's Board of
Investment.
2. Id. at (i) - (ii).
3. UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL OmcE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 587(1968) (table 190). This figure represents an estimate of Indonesia's
production at market prices expressed in Indonesian currency con-
verted to United States dollars at the prevailing exchange rate. Id. at
590 (note to table 190). Some economists feel that statistics com-
puted in this manner understate the value the less developed coun-
tries' product would have in the United States. Professor Hagen has
made "crude adjustments" in order to "indicate to Westerners the value
in Westerner's eyes of the per capita product in the low income coun-
tries." E. HAGEN, TnE EcONOpmcs OF DEvELoprm= 14 (1968). He
concludes that a "generous estimate" can be determined by multiplying
the above figure by 3. If so, Indonesia's per capita gross domestic
product would be approximately $300.
The significance of this figure from a humanitarian standpoint be-
comes apparent when it is realized that in 1963, when the per capita
gross domestic product in the United States was $2,857,
1 in 7 of all families of two or more and almost half of all
persons living alone or with nonrelatives had incomes too
low ... to enable them to eat even the minimal diet that
could be expected to provide adequate nutrition and still have
enough left over to pay for all other living essentials.
Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, 28
SocIAL SEcunTY BuLL. 3, 4 (Jan., 1965).
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can be generated through domestic savings is obviously limited. 4
Foreign investment, is therefore, a necessary supplement to do-
mestic capital formation. Foreign investment also may be helpful
both because it often is accompanied by a direct transfer of
technology and because it adds to foreign exchange, thereby
increasing the country's capacity to import equipment which
utilizes technology. 5 Both capital and technology are needed,
if development is to proceed rapidly.6
Representatives of Indonesia are presently negotiating the
terms of a proposed double tax treaty with the United States.
Tax experts in the Indonesian government recognize that tax
and similar incentives should not be used indiscriminately 7 and
that some incentives contained in treaties8 have been criticized
4. See generally R. GILL, ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT: PAST AND
PRESENT 92-93 (2d ed. 1967); R. NURSKE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMA-
TMON IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 5 (1953); P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS
754-55 (8th ed. 1970). Surprisingly, perhaps, less developed countries
managed to save an average of 15% of their gross national products dur-
ing the period 1960-1967. See L. PEARSON, PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT
30-31 (1969). However, it has been estimated that a country must
achieve gross capital formation of between 12% to 15% of its gross
domestic product just to keep pace with a population growth of 2%
per year. E. HAGEN, supra note 3, at 275.
5. E. HAGEN, supra note 3, at 328; R. GILL, supra note 4, at 94.
6. "Only two causes of economic development are of any im-
portance. These are capital formation and technical progress." E.
HAGEN, supra note 3, at 29. This is not to say, however, that other
factors, often called "barriers to development," may not restrain
growth even if adequate capital and technology are present. See gen-
erally R. GILL, supra note 4, at 86-89; E. HAGEN, supra note 3, at ch. 6;
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 4, at ch. 38.
7. Dr. Sadli has indicated that tax holidays "will not be granted
indiscriminately any more." Sadli, supra note 1, at (iv). For existing
incentive devices applicable to foreign firms, see INDONESIAN LAW No.
1, ch. VI (1967) (Foreign Capital Investment).
8. Examples of provisions which appear in existing treaties-as
well as some which, while negotiated, never became effective-include:
the treaty between Sweden and Thailand in which the former simply
exempts from tax income having its source in Thailand; the former
draft treaty between the United States and Pakistan in which the
United States would have allowed a credit for taxes normally imposed
by Pakistan despite the fact that Pakistan waived the taxes during a
tax holiday (called tax sparing, i.e., granting a credit for a waived or
"spared" tax); the treaty between Germany and India in which a Ger-
man lender may credit 50% of the German tax that would otherwise
have been imposed without regard to whether India imposes and then
spares a tax on the interest; the former draft U.S.-Brazil Treaty in
which the United States would have allowed a credit against United
States tax liability equal to 7% of the amount invested in certain types
of assets in Brazil; the draft treaty between the United States and
Trinidad and Tobago in which the United States would have deferred
tax on any gain realized upon transfers of certain technology to Trini-
[Vol. 56:755
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as deficient from the standpoint of tax policyY They neverthe-
less are considering advancing a proposal which, while not itself
an incentive, is clearly intended to encourage foreign firms to
invest capital in Indonesia. The United States has refused to use
special incentives in treaties to encourage private investment in
less developed countries, having first negotiated and then re-
jected several treaties containing incentives.'0 And in light of the
political climate presently"- prevailing in this country, it is not
clear whether Indonesia will be able to persuade the United
States to accept any proposal containing incentives, even if the
proposal is sound from the standpoint of tax policy. 12 This article
dad and Tobago corporations. For a general discussion of tax in-
centives contained in treaties see Carroll, Germany, Japan and Sweden
Show the United States How to Reach Tax Treaties With South Ameri-
can Countries, 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rsv. 199 (1969).
9. For a general treatment of tax treaties with less developed
countries, see Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Coun-
tries, U. N. Doc. E/4614, ST/ECA/110 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tax
Treaties]. For articles discussing tax sparing, see Crockett, "Tax Spar-
ing": A Legend Finally Reaches Print, 11 NAT'L TAx J. 146 (1958);
Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and "Tax Sparing", 11 NAT'L TAX 3.
156 (1958). For a discussion favoring the proposal to include a 7%
investment credit in the treaty with Brazil, see Sitrick, Conventions for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation Between United States and Latin
America: The Proposed Convention Between United States and Brazil,
45 TAxs 380 (1967). For a discussion of the provision deferring gain
on the transfer of technological information to a foreign corporation, see
Technical Explanation by Treasury Dep't on the Convention Between
the United States and Trinidad and Tobago for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and the Encouragement of
International Trade and Investment, signed Jan. 9, 1970, 2 CCH TAx
TREAxiEs 7655.
10. Tax Treaties, supra note 9, at 41. See also notes 3 & 4 supra.
11. Perhaps the growing antipathy toward granting assistance to
less developed countries is inevitable. As Stent puts it:
Onward from the first days of his infancy, [man] perceives
the world in an expanding series of concentric spheres-his
own person, his family, his neighborhood, his town, his prov-
ince his nation-within which, with increasing distance from
him, events assume an ever diminishing emotional signifi-
cance. His own toothache causes him more pain than the
broken leg of his brother, which in turn causes him more pain
than the death of a neighbor, of a dozen strangers, of a hun-
dred foreigners.
Stent, An Ode to Objectivity, 228 ATLANTc MoNTrLy 125 (Nov., 1971).
12. In early 1971, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected
a proposed incentive because in the Committee's view the many
domestic problems of the United States, including the current balance
of payments deficits, are important considerations which must be borne
in mind when determining whether to approve measures in tax treaties
which are designed to defer taxes of United States corporations for
the purpose of encouraging investment in less developed countries.
2 CCH TAx TFEAsms V 7656.
With roughly one half of the world's population suffering from
1972]
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is not the place to speculate on political considerations, however,
and the following discussion is limited to an examination of the
proposal from the standpoint of 'tax policy.
II. THE PROPOSAL
The proposal is simple. The United States is to allow a
credit against liability for the United States federal income tax
for income taxes paid the Komishi Indonesia Parkenbangam
(KIP-roughly the Commission for Indonesia Development).
KIP, which has yet to be formed, will probably be an agency of
the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, which is a department of the
central government that corresponds to our Treasury Depart-
ment. Since the United States generally allows a credit for
income taxes paid "to any foreign country," 13 and since for these
purposes a foreign country "means any foreign state or polit-
ical subdivision thereof, or any foreign political entity, which
levies and collects income ... taxes,' 1 4 income taxes paid to
KIP would appear eligible for such a credit. However, the man-
ner in which KIP will collect income taxes and dispose of the re-
sulting revenues will be somewhat unique.
KIP will be designed to accomplish two things: (1) to en-
courage firms to make those investments which otherwise would
be uneconomical due to the inadequacy of existing infrastruc-
ture (e.g., roads, piers, docks and power facilities); and (2) to en-
courage those firms that have decided to invest in Indonesia to
construct infrastructure which may be helpful to the economy
generally, either by being available to others, or by lessening
the burden the firm otherwise would place on existing facilities.
One of the factors tending to discourage both foreign and
domestic investment in a country such as Indonesia is the inade-
hunger, malnutrition or both; with the United States presently enjoy-
ing about one third of the world's output (we have only 6% of its
population); with the real gross domestic product of developed coun-
tries growing (during the period 1955-65) at the rate of $43 per year per
person while the less developed countries were averaging $3 per person
(and those in Southeast Asia $1 per person); with all this, one wonders
about the Committee's sense of priorities. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION, TmI WORLD FOOD SURVEY (1963), cited in E. HAGEN,
supra note 3, at 7 (table 1-1); UNITED NATIONS BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS, The Role of Private Enterprise in Investment and Promotion
of Exports in Developing Countries 4, U. N. Doc. TD/35/Supp. 1 (1967);
UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY 19, (table 3) (1967). As
Samuelson puts it, "For conscience's sake, we are impelled to help.
Besides, history teaches us that men do not always starve quietly."
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 4, at 741.
13. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 901 (b) [hereinafter cited as IRC].
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b) (1957).
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quacy of existing infrastructure. Some extreme examples can be
seen in the more remote regions outside Java where investors
may often find it necessary to provide, at their own expense, vir-
tually all the facilities that normally are supplied by govern-
ments.15 The case is less extreme in the more developed areas of
the country where- existing facilities cannot meet the increased
demands when industrial or similar facilities are established in
the area they serve. In both cases, the lack of infrastructure may
substantially increase the cost of establishing operations so that
many investments are not made at all or are made in crowded
areas around Djakarta rather than in the less developed regions.
KIP, by sharply reducing the cost to the firm of establishing in-
frastructure, may be able to stimulate investment and, in addi-
15. For example, the Contract of Work Between the Republic of
Indonesia and P.T. International Nickel Indonesia (copy on file with
MNx. L. REv.) states:
ADDITIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE(a) Cooperation. The Company and the Government
will cooperate, together with others, in planning and obtaining
financing for such facilities as may be useful to both the
Project and to existing and future industries and activities
in the region. For example, up-to-date living accommodations
for the Company's personnel will require provision for ade-
quate housing, food supplies, medical facilities, water, sewage
facilities, pest and disease control and educational, religious
and recreation facilities. Similarly, the Project's power needs
will require construction of a power plant or plants, by the
Company or by others, which may be hydroelectric, thermal
or nuclear in design and may further entail pipelines, _power
lines, canals, 'dams, raceways and pumping stations. To the
extent part or all of such requisite living accommodations and
power facilities are not financed in whole or in part by others,
it will be the Company's responsibility to ensure that such
needs of the Project and its employees will be adequately met.
(b) Hydroelectric Power. As part of its evaluation, the
Company will undertake to secure and finance, as part of
the Project's costs, a feasibility study of the hydroelectric power
potential of the Larona River in relation to the needs of the
Project. Should such a facility prove economically feasible, the
Company will be prepared as a possible aid in its financing, to
enter into long term contracts on terms to be agreed with
the Government, or other entity designated by the Govern-
ment, to take its electric power requirements from a hydro-
electric power facility in the Larona River.(c) Regional Benefits. To maximize the regional econo-
mic and social benefits which the Project can generate, the
Company will also:i) Endeavor to coordinate all of its studies of the
Project's infrastructure studies undertaken by the Govern-
ment and interest local, foreign and international public
and private entities; and(ii) Endeavor to assist and advise the Government in
its planning of the infrastructure and regional development
which the Company may deem useful to the Project and
to existing and future industries and activities in the re-
gion of the Project.
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion, enable the government to channel investment into the more
remote regions.
Reducing the cost of infrastructure also will enable KIP to
meet the second objective. If the cost of constructing a facility
can be lowered, firms which are investing in Indonesia may be
persuaded to establish facilities they otherwise would forego,
thereby providing facilities which either can be used by others
or which would reduce the strain on existing facilities. If, for
example, KIP can encourage a timber company to construct a
pier, it will not only reduce the company's future operating costs,
but also provide a facility which can be used by others. Simi-
larly, KIP might persuade several firms investing in an area to
cooperate in providing a hydroelectric or other power facility.
Investors who conclude that the existing infrastructure is
inadequate for their purposes will be invited to submit to KIP
proposals for the construction of the needed items. In addition,
KIP may initiate infrastructure construction programs by sug-
gesting them to one or more firms investing in the area to be
served by the proposed facility. When the proposals come from
firms, KIP will be responsible for determining whether the pro-
gram will further KIP's objectives and may propose desired mod-
ifications in the suggested specifications. Both KIP and the for-
eign investor will be free to reject the proposals advanced by
the other, and if agreement cannot be reached, the investor will
remain free to proceed without participation by KIP. If, how-
ever, the investor and KIP are able to agree upon the specifica-
tions, they will enter into an agreement containing some or all of
the following terms.
A. AGREEMENT TERMS
The agreement will identify the facility that is to be con-
structed pursuant to the agreement and delineate the agreed spec-
ifications. The agreement will provide that as construction of
the facility progresses the investor will deposit with KIP, as pre-
payment of Indonesia taxes, the funds needed to meet the cost
of constructing the facility and that KIP will use these funds
for this purpose. 16 The investor will agree to waive its right to
benefit from tax holidays until such time as it has paid Indo-
16. It is anticipated that frequently the infrastructure will actually
be constructed by the investor with which KIP has executed an agree-
ment. Under these circumstances, KIP will release funds to the in-
vestor as construction progresses. In other cases, the funds will be paid
directly to the firm hired to construct the facility.
[Vol. 56:755
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nesian income taxes equalling the construction cost of the facil-
ity. However, for this purpose (and only for this purpose), the
investor will be permitted to treat the funds deposited with
KIP as prepayments of these taxes. Upon payment of taxes in
this amount, the investor again will become eligible for the bene-
fits of any tax holiday to which it normally would have been en-
titled and will be permitted to enjoy these benefits for the
unexpired portion (if any) of the term of the holiday.
For example, assume that KIP and an investing firm agree
that the construction of a $1 million pier at a given location in In-
donesia will not only reduce future operating costs of the firm,
but will also contribute significantly to the economic development
of the surrounding areas. Assume further that the Minister of
Finance has determined that the investor would be entitled to a
four year tax holiday, if no special arrangements with KIP were
undertaken.
Under these circumstances, the firm and KIP might enter into
an agreement pursuant to which a pier meeting mutually accept-
able specifications would be constructed with funds supplied
KIP by the firm as construction of the pier progresses. The
agreement would also provide that the investor must pay In-
donesian taxes on any Indonesian source income earned by it,
notwithstanding tax holidays to which it would normally have
been entitled. However, the firm would be permitted to treat the
funds supplied to KIP as prepayments of this tax. Thus, if the
firm generated $2 million of Indonesian source income during the
first four years of operation, subject to a 50% corporate tax rate,
it would be permitted to treat the $1 million paid to KIP as a pre-
payment of the approximately $1 million of Indonesian tax that
would be imposed on this income. If it took less than four years
to realize this amount of income, the firm would be entitled to the
benefits of the tax holiday throughout the remainder of the four-
year term. On the other hand, if the firm had not generated $2
million of income by the end of the tax holiday, it would not be al-
lowed to credit amounts deposited with KIP against liability
for taxes thereafter. Thus, amounts deposited with KIP which
were not used to pay Indonesian tax would simply be forfeited.
The agreement would provide that the resulting infrastruc-
ture would belong to the government of Indonesia. When ap-
propriate, the facility would be available for use by the govern-
ment and the Indonesian public generally. It is expected that
KIP will have the authority, however, to permit certain prefer-
1972]
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ential use by the investor 17 and to participate in construction of
a facility for use by the investor only.'8
In order to be certain that no one loses sight of the fact that
KIP is in a very real sense spending Indonesian government funds
(and this is true notwithstanding the fact that the revenues
otherwise would have been waived through tax concessions
since, as will be illustrated, concessions also are an expenditure of
government funds), it is anticipated that publicity and report-
ing requirements will be established. The plan presently un-
der consideration requires KIP to publish in an official newspa-
per and file with the Secretary of the Indonesian legislature any
arrangement it proposes to accept 30 days prior to the effective
date of the arrangement. In addition, KIP will be required to
file a financial accounting with the President and legislature an-
nually.
B. BENEFITS TO CORPORATIONS PARTICIPATING IN KIP's PROGRAMS
The benefits to an investor participating in the program will
be derived both from the use of the facilities and from the sav-
ings derived from the tax treatment given 'the amounts paid by
the investor for construction of the facility. While the inves-
tor will have provided the Indonesian government with the
funds used to construct the facility, these funds will be eligible
for credit against the investor's liability for Indonesian and
United States tax. Since Indonesian taxes otherwise would
have been waived, it is obvious that the significant benefit will
come from the United States tax treatment of these amounts.
These benefits will be twofold. The first will relate to timing
and the second to the amount of United States tax that will be
paid.
1. The Value of Deferral
If the proposal is not in effect, an investor constructing a
facility in Indonesia will recover its cost in the form of deduc-
tions for depreciation or amortization which will be taken over
the useful life of 'the facility. To take advantage of these deduc-
tions, the firm must, of course, generate taxable income from
which to deduct the depreciation, and when it does so, each $1
17. For example, KIP might waive the fee it would otherwise
charge for use of a pier constructed under the program.
18. An example might be a power facility used to capacity by
the investor.
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of income will be offset by a $1 deduction for depreciation,
thereby saving 50 cents in tax. To the extent deductions are
taken in years in which the firm is entitled to a holiday from In-
donesian taxes, the benefits normally will not be felt until the
firm repatriates funds to the United States.' 0 At this time, the
deductions, by reducing earnings and profits, will reduce the
United States tax on the distributions (assuming that the distri-
butions exceed other earnings and profits).
In contrast, under the KIP proposal being considered by In-
donesia, the useful life of the facility is immaterial and the in-
vestor will recover the amount paid to construct the facility
(i.e., the taxes paid KIP and used by it to construct the facility)
as a direct credit against its tax liability upon the generation
of Indonesian source income. Again, each $1 of Indonesian
source income will result in a tax savings of 50 cents (here, each
$1 of Indonesian income will be accompanied by a potential
tax liability of 50 cents which will be offset by a credit for the
amount paid KIP). Since the credit against Indonesian tax lia-
bility will be available only during the period which the firm
would otherwise have been enjoying the benefits of tax holidays
in Indonesia, the tax benefits will not normally be felt until the
funds are repatriated, at which time the amounts paid KIP will
be creditable against liability for United States tax.
A comparison of the time value of the tax benefits can be il-
lustrated by the following example. Assume that the facility
in question (a) will cost $2 million, (b) will have a useful life of
20 years, and (c) will have a zero salvage value at the end of its
useful life. Assume also that the corporation generates $1 million
of predepreciation taxable income in all relevant years. If the
firm constructs the facility and computes its depreciation on the
straight line method, the deductions will reduce taxable income
by $100,000 a year. Thus, since the project will have generated
more than $100,000 per year in predepreciation income, taxes
will be reduced by $50,000 a year for 20 years. The present value
of saving $50,000 a year for 20 years (discounted at a very conser-
vative rate of 6% per annum) is approximately $575,000.
On the other hand, under the KIP proposal the tax signifi-
cance will depend only on the capacity of the project to develop
income and not on the useful life of the facility. Thus, if the op-
eration generates $1 million of income per year so that the firm
19. Operations will normally be carried on by an Indonesian sub-
sidiary; thus the savings of United States tax will not be felt until the
investor repatriates earnings to the United States.
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will have earned $2 million of income during the first two years of
operation, the present value of the $1 million of tax savings will
be approximately $910,000. As will be shown below, the tax sav-
ings under the present proposal will be $2 million, not $1 million;
the point being made here, however, is that the difference in tim-
ing alone can result in substantial differences in the present value
of the tax savings, even if the amount of tax saved is the same,
as it is in the above example.
2. Credit v. Depreciation
The second advantage to the United States investor is at-
tributable to the difference for tax purposes between a deduction
and a credit. If the KIP proposal is not in effect, the cost of
infrastructure, for United States tax purposes, will be recovered
as deductions which reduce taxable income and earnings and
profits. Assuming a 50% tax rate, each $1 of deductible cost will
reduce tax by 50 cents. On the other hand, under the proposal the
cost of the infrastructure will be reflected in taxes paid KIP
which will be creditable against United States tax, dollar for dol-
lar.20 In short, wholly apart from the differences attributable to
20. While this statement is correct if the operations are carried
on by a branch of a United States corporation, it is an oversimplifica-
tion if the operations are in an Indonesian subsidiary since, under these
circumstances, only 50% of the amount paid KIP will actually serve as
a credit against United States tax. IRC § 902 (a) (2). However, in
either case, the net effect will be as stated in the text. Assume, for
example, that a firm generates $4 million of Indonesian source income
after having paid KIP $2 million. If the firm operates through a
branch, the full amount paid KIP will be treated as taxes paid Indonesia
and the firm will credit this amount directly against its United States
tax liability of $2 million. Consequently, the firm's after-tax earnings
will equal $2 million and there will also be a positive cash flow of
this amount. The same net result will be reached if the operations are
held by an Indonesian subsidiary. The $2 million paid KIP will dis-
charge the subsidiary's Indonesian tax liability, thereby reducing its
Indonesian tax earnings to $2 million. Upon repatriation of these
earnings to the United States parent, a tentative United States tax lia-
bility of $1 million will arise which will, however, be fully offset
by the credit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.902-3 (i) (Example 2).
$2 million (the dividend) x $2 million (the Indonesian tax)
$4 million (pretax Indonesian $1 million
earnings)
Thus, after tax earnings and positive cash flow again will be $2
million despite the fact that only one half of the amount paid KIP is
used directly as a credit. The two results are the same because when
the business is operated by an Indonesian subsidiary the amounts paid
KIP serve dual purposes. They serve to reduce earnings by the full
amount paid KIP and in addition serve to shield a like amount of in-
come from tax by being creditable against the United States tax other-
wise imposed on that income.
[Vol. 56:755
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timing, the tax benefits available under the present proposal are
twice as valuable as those available from deductions for deprecia-
tion.
Again using the above example, if the firm is generating tax-
able income at the rate of $1 million per year, it will, by the end
of the fourth year, have generated $4 million of income, thereby
creating a potential tax liability of approximately $2 million.
The $2 million deposited with KIP up to that time will be credited
against this liability as it accrues throughout the four year pe-
riod. The present value of a $2 million tax savings realized rat-
ably over a four year period is approximately $1,720,000. This is
to be contrasted with the present value of tax savings result-
ing from deducting $2 million of depreciation ratably over the 20
year life of a facility of approximately $575,000. Obviously, the
difference is substantial.
Two further comments must be made. First, computations of
the present value of eliminating future tax liabilities are prem-
ised on the conclusion that the liability would not othervise
have been postponed. If, to take an extreme example, there
would have been no United States tax liability on any earnings
generated during the first 20 years of operations (because no
funds were repatriated to the United States, for example), the
present value of all tax savings must be discounted for 20 years
rather than ratably over the intervening years. Under these cir-
cumstances, the discounted cost of $1 of tax imposed 20 years
from now on income earned next year is the same as the dis-
counted cost of $1 of tax imposed 20 years from now on income
earned 20 years from now. (The conclusion that the present pro-
posal results in a credit which is twice as valuable as a deduction
is not affected by this last observation, however.)
The second point is that even if the actual tax liability can be
postponed for 20 years, the timing of the tax benefits will have a
significant effect on the amount of earnings that are reportable
for financial accounting purposes in the interim. This factor is
considered further below in Part Ill A, where the KIP proposal is
compared with an incentive device known as tax sparing.
3. Benefits to Indonesia
The benefits to Indonesia are substantial. First, for the rea-
sons outlined above, the proposal will permit the Indonesian gov-
ernment to reduce the extra costs to a firm of investing in an
area where facilities are inadequate far more effectively than
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the government could through the use of conventional tax holi-
days. Second, in contrast to conventional incentives where the
government simply waives taxes and receives nothing in return,
the government will receive funds which will be used to provide
facilities which may contribute substantially to the country's de-
velopment. Moreover, the funds used for this purpose, under
normal tax holiday schemes, ultimately would have been paid to
the United States as taxes. In short, Indonesia can offer more
meaningful assistance to investors and receive substantial bene-
fits in return. Finally, the KIP proposal may increase the amount
of tax Indonesia will collect from participating firms since firms
will not be entitled to take the deductions for depreciation they
would otherwise take after termination of the tax holiday.
III. UNITED STATES TAX CONSEQUENCES
As noted, the United States normally allows a credit for in-
come taxes paid to political subdivisions of foreign governments.
The question here is whether the peculiarities in the way in which
KIP will conduct its affairs warrants a different result here.
A. TAX SPARING
The proposal being considered by Indonesia bears some sim-
ilarity to "tax sparing." Tax sparing is a credit for a "spared"
foreign tax, that is, a tax normally imposed by the host country
but waived during a tax holiday. Under tax sparing, the tax-
payer pays a tax to neither the foreign government nor the United
States. The similarity lies in the fact that both devices require the
capital exporting country to grant a tax credit when it might
not normally be willing to do S0.21 There are significant dif-
ferences, however. Under tax sparing both the less developed
country and the United States forego the collection of tax, and
the cost of any needed infrastructure (which may or may not
correspond in amount to the forgiven tax) is borne by the tax-
payer. Under the KIP proposal being considered by Indonesia
on the other hand, a tax is paid but government funds in a like
amount are used to construct a facility for the investor. The
questions to consider here are whether these differences war-
rant reaching different results and, if not, whether tax sparing
21. It is not clear whether the United States would allow a credit
for taxes paid KIP absent a treaty provision. See New York & Hon-
duras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1948).
This problem must be clarified, however, if KIP is to serve as a
reliable incentive.
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should be considered unsound from the standpoint of United
States tax policy.
Tax sparing has been attacked on a number of grounds.22
First, tax sparing is criticized as inequitable in that those in-
vesting capital in the United States must pay a full tax, whereas
those investing in a sparing country are taxed neither by the
foreign government nor the United States. If tax sparing is tied
to a tax holiday of fairly short duration, this criticism is probably
justified,23 because decisions concerning the quantity of capital
22. For articles criticizing tax sparing see Sitrick, Conventions for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation Between United States and Latin
America: The Proposed Convention Between United States and Brazil,
45 TAXES 380 (1967); Surrey, International Tax Conventions: How
They Operate and What They Accomplish, 23 J. TAXAT7ON 364 (1965);
Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and "Tax Sparing," 11 NAT'L TAX J.
156 (1958).
23. Arguments concerning taxpayer equity are often based on the
(usually unstated) premise that capital invested in more heavily taxed
industries will receive a lower after tax return than that invested else-
where, as the discussion of tax neutrality in the Appendix at Part II A
infra will show. However, if unequal tax burdens are allowed to per-
sist until those affected thereby can fully adjust to them, capital will
tend to receive the same rate of after tax return notwithstanding the
unequal tax burdens (indeed, this is the very premise upon which the
concept of tax neutrality is based). Determining the final incidence or
burden of a tax (and thus, presumably, whether it is equitable) can be
extremely difficult, however, and there is no agreement among
economists concerning the final incidence of the corporate income tax
in the United States. Mieszkowsld, Tax Incidence Theory: The Effects
of Taxes on the Distribution of Income, 7 J. EcoN. Lir. 1103 (1969).
As the Appendix illustrates at Part II A 1 & 2, corporations in competi-
tive industries do not bear the ultimate burden of tax but rather pass
it on to consumers, shareholders or employees in the form of higher
prices, lower dividends or lower salaries. Some observations concern-
ing the ultimate burden of the tax can be made, however. For exam-
ple, consumers who favor goods produced in the corporate sector suf-
fer when a corporate tax is imposed because corporate production is
lowered. Similarly, those favoring goods produced in the noncorporate
sector gain under these circumstances due to increased production.
In the long run, labor in the taxed and nontaxed sectors will receive
the same pay for the same effort (or it will relocate) and the same
is true for capital for identical reasons. But whether labor or capital
will bear the burden of the tax will depend upon a number of factors.
Assume, for example, that the ratio in which firms use labor and
capital in the taxed sector is wholly rigid and that production is much
more labor intensive there than in the nontaxed sector. Imposition of
a tax on the return to capital in the corporate sector will decrease
productivity and drive both labor and capital from that sector (capi-
tal will leave because it is taxed and labor must also leave because only
a specific amount of labor can work with any given quantity of capital).
Since more labor is used with each unit of capital in the taxed sector
than the untaxed sector, the ratio of labor to capital in the untaxed
sector will increase. This will tend to decrease the productivity of
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to be invested and the ratio in which the firm is to use labor
and capital2 4 usually will be made in light of the expected after-
tax rate of return after the holiday has terminated. If so, firms
will attempt to earn a rate of return which will permit them to
pay the taxes that will normally be imposed and still yield a com-
petitive return to their shareholders. It follows that if this objec-
tive is accomplished during the period the tax holiday is in effect
while taxes are being paid, the firm will reap a windfall profit
which might be properly be regarded as inequitable.
The KIP proposal would not appear to be subject to this de-
ficiency, however. The firm will be able to make its investment
decision knowing that the facility covered by its agreement with
KIP will be provided by that agency. The firm also will have
made an advance deposit which it can credit against future In-
donesian income tax liability. Both long term and short term
profits will be subject to tax; accordingly, the operation must
be capable of producing a competitive after tax return from
the outset so that no excess or windfall profits will be realized
during early operations. Thus, by tying the incentive to the cost
of specific facilities rather than reducing taxation on all in-
come for a given period, the incentive should not produce in-
equitable excess returns.
The second objection to tax sparing is that it is "capricious"
in that the benefit depends on the nominal rate of tax in the less
developed country. This objection has been overcome by some
developed countries through the use of a variety of techniques, 25
and these techniques could be used here, if desirable. However,
firms using the KIP proposal will pay a tax to either Indonesia or
labor in that sector which may reduce the return to it, while leaving
the return to capital unchanged or even increased. If so, the burden of
a tax on capital would be borne by labor. For an extensive discussion
of the final incidence or burden of the corporate income tax in the
United States, see Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation In-
come Tax, 70 J. POL. EcoN. 215 (1962).
24. See text accompanying Appendix notes 19-21 infra.
25. Article 16(3) (b) (bb) of the German-Indian Treaty of 1959
provides that German lenders may credit 50% of the German tax that
would otherwise be imposed on interest received from Indian sources
without regard to whether India imposes a tax on that interest. 9
Int'i Tax Agreements No. 28, U. N. Doc. ST/ECA/Ser. C/a (1958 cur-
rent supp.). In short, India's nominal tax rate is irrelevant. Other
means of avoiding capriciousness are (1) to limit the amount of for-
eign tax that can be spared, (2) to provide that no discriminatory
rates may be imposed and then spared, and (3) to limit the amount of
spared taxes to an amount equal to that imposed under rates in
effect at the time the treaty is negotiated.
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the United States which either equals or exceeds (because total
Indonesian taxes are greater than United States taxes) the tax
paid by firms doing business in the United States.
The third objection to tax sparing is that it encourages the
repatriation of earnings. To the extent this is valid, it is an ob-
jection to the KIP proposal as well. However, this criticism is
unsound, at least in its unqualified form. Normally, earnings
can be transferred by a subsidiary to its parent, or by a parent
to its subsidiary, without incurring any substantial tax liabil-
ity.26 If a tax incentive, such as a tax holiday without tax spar-
ing, is used by the foreign country in which the subsidiary is op-
erating, a United States tax will be payable upon the remittance
of earnings to the United States parent. The introduction of
tax sparing removes this impediment to the remittance of earn-
ings thereby restoring the normal condition of free transferabil-
ity of earnings. It seems wrong to conclude that this return to
the normal condition "encourages" the remittance of earnings.
It seems more accurate to say that it eliminates a non-neutral im-
pediment to this repatriation.
There are two additional less theoretical answers to this third
objection. Few things are as comforting to the management of
a corporation which is making its initial investment in a less de-
veloped country than the belief that the operation is capable of
generating withdrawable earnings during a period of time in
which, in the judgment of the many experts and nonexperts
that will be consulted on this matter, the country will remain
politically stable. If management knows that the earnings will
be fully taxable by the United States if withdrawn, it knows that
it must double pretax earnings, which often means it must dou-
ble, or at least substantially extend the time that will be needed
to generate these earnings. Reasonably accurate predictions of
political stability may be possible for three or four years but
seem almost impossible when the time is extended to six or eight
years. This in no way means that the earnings will in fact be
withdrawn if the investment appears sound and the situation
26. If both the parent and subsidiary are United States corpora-
tions, the transfer of earnings from the subsidiary to the parent will
be subject to the intercorporate dividends received deduction (IRC§ 243) and transfers from the parent to the subsidiary will be tax free
under IRC §§ 118 & 351. With a foreign subsidiary the tax that would
otherwise be paid by the parent upon the receipt of dividends from the
subsidiary will be. offset by the foreign tax credit (IRC §§ 901 & 903)
and transfers from the parent to the subsidiary will be tax free under
IRC §§ 118 & 351 (unless appreciated property is used, in which case
the parent may be required to comply with IRC § 367).
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stable three or four years after the investment has been made. It
simply means that the shorter the period of anticipated risk, the
more likely management will take the risk initially.
The second answer relates to financial accounting. One of
the foremost objectives of managements is the maximization of
the earnings that can be reported to shareholders and prospec-
tive purchasers of the corporation's debt and equity securities.
Under accepted accounting practices in the United States, a firm
must establish a reserve for the federal taxes it will have to pay
upon repatriation of earnings unless "the income has been, or
there is evidence that it will be, permanently invested" abroad.27
The KIP proposal permits management to increase these report-
able earnings by 50% of the amount paid to construct the facil-
ity.28
A fourth objection to tax sparing is that it encourages less
developed countries to enact tax incentive legislation. In light
of the fact that most, if not all, less developed countries (as well
as many developed countries) have enacted such legislation with-
out the inducement of tax sparing, this criticism does not seem
particularly persuasive.
The final,29 and clearly the most important, criticism of tax
sparing is that it departs from tax neutrality.30 Taxes are "neu-
tral" when taxpayers are subjected to uniform tax burdens. An
27. See 2 CCH AMEmICAN INsTITUTE OF C.P.A., ACCT'ING PRINCI-
PLES, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 51 at fJ 16.
28. The cost required to obtain the use of a facility will, if
written off as deductions for depreciation, reduce earnings over the life
of the facility by the full amount paid less the amount of taxes saved
since taxable income is reduced by deductions reflecting the deprecia-
tion of the facility. Thus, if a firm invests $1 million in a fully de-
preciable facility, its earnings will be reduced by $1 million in de-
preciation less the $500,000 of tax saved by depreciation. If the firm
obtains a facility with funds treated as taxes, there is no reduction of
earnings for the funds are used $1 for $1 to offset a potential liability
for tax. Moreover, the increase in earnings will be reported as soon
as the firm generates income and must either pay a tax or set up a re-
serve for the taxes that will become due when the funds are repatriated
to the United States.
29. Some objections to tax sparing which are not discussed here
appear in previously cited authorities. See Surrey, supra note 9;
Tax Treaties, supra note 9.
30. The report of the United Nations group of experts on tax
treaties between developed and developing countries notes that:
One member from a developed country using the tax credit
method explained the basic concept of tax neutrality as con-
ceived by his country, with which a tax-sparing credit would
be regarded as not compatible.
Tax Treaties, supra note 9, at 22.
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income tax on earnings from personal services must be the same
for all occupations;3 1 taxes paid by business firms must be im-
posed at the same rate regardless of the goods or services pro-
duced or the productive techniques employed; and finally, the tax
paid by consumers cannot depend on the goods or services they
choose to consume. On an international basis taxes must not in-
terfere with, among other things, the choice between domestic
and foreign investments.
Many who advocate adhering to a policy of tax neutrality
do so because they have concluded that productivity will be maxi-
mized in certain important respects if the manner in which re-
sources are used is determined by the free play of prices and
markets. Consequently, if taxes are permitted to interfere, pro-
ductivity will be depressed, thereby lowering our standard of liv-
ing. These proponents of tax neutrality can point to certain
assumptions and conclusions accepted by many economists re-
garding economic behavior which lend support to the conclusion
that tax neutrality will serve to maximize consumer welfare. 32
Under this analysis, the objective, and thus the standard
against which the economy's performance is measured, is the
maximization of the aggregate value of all goods and services
produced by the economy. Value for these purposes means the
capacity to yield utility and satisfaction to the consumers of
the output 33 and is measured by price.34 The objective will be
met if the returns to capital and labor are proportionate to the
values of their contributions to output. Put another way, the
amounts paid owners of productive resources (i.e., the owners of
capital or the suppliers of labor) must be proportionate to the
price consumers will pay for the goods or services produced by
the use of the resources, because under these circumstances ef-
forts of resource owners to maximize their return will lead
them to seek employment of these resources where the value of
the goods and services they are able to produce is maximized.35
While firms operating in perfect competition normally will
31. A tax, particularly a very high tax, may not be neutral even
if it is imposed at the same rate on all earnings. For example, a
person might select a low paying but more pleasant job if any addi-
tional earnings are heavily taxed. However, for purposes of this dis-
cussion, a tax will be considered neutral if it is not imposed at different
rates on different investments or forms of employment.
32. A version of the underlying analysis supporting tax neutrality
is included in the Appendix at Part IL
33. See text accompanying Appendix note 1 infra.
34. See text accompanying Appendix notes 1-6 infra.
35. See text accompanying Appendix notes 6-9 infra.
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tend to perform in this manner," 6 the imposition of some forms of
taxes, by changing the relationship between the returns to re-
source owners and the value of the contrubition of their re-
sources to output will cause them not to do so. Taxes which in-
terfere with this relationship are said not to be "neutral." This
interference can cause effects termed here as either a "factor
tax effect" or an "excise tax effect." If, for example, a tax is
measured by gross receipts in one or more but not all indus-
tries, it will have what is here called an excise tax effect of de-
pressing production in that industry.37 If, on the other hand, the
tax is measured by the return to one factor of production (e.g.,
a withholding tax on wages paid to labor) and is imposed in less
than all industries, it will have the factor tax effect of both de-
pressing productivity in that industry and causing firms in that
industry to use too little of the taxed resource. 38 While not all
economists agree with this conclusion,39 it appears 'that the cor-
porate income tax is a factor tax imposed on the return to capital
in the corporate sector.40 If so, the corporate income tax is itself
not neutral. Under these circumstances, proponents of tax neu-
trality probably will have to settle for a tax policy that prevents
further distortions in the corporate sector. 41
To summarize, under this tax neutrality theory the objective
is to maximize the value of the economy's production. It will be
met only if the amounts paid to resource owners are proportionate
to the price consumers pay for the goods or services produced
thereby. Taxes are usually considered neutral only if they do
not interfere with the efforts of firms to preserve this relation-
ship. In the United States, however, the term must be given a
special meaning, for it is probable that the corporate income tax
is itself not neutral. Accordingly, since most foreign investments
36. See text accompanying Appendix notes 9-21 infra.
37. See text accompanying Appendix notes 24-31 infra.
38. See text accompanying Appendix note 32 infra.
39. Some economists have concluded that corporations are able to
"shift" the corporate income tax on to consumers through increased
prices. See Appendix note 38 infra and preceding text. Professor
Peggy B. Musgrave has concluded:
If general shifting of the corporate income tax to the extent
of the tax rate imposed by each country of source of income
were a firmly established fact of life, taxation only by the
country of source would be justified on neutrality grounds.
P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME
115 (1969). For a discussion suggesting that the corporate income
tax will constitute a factor tax even if it can be shifted, see text ac-
companying Appendix notes 38-39 infra.
40. Appendix at Part III.
41. See text accompanying Appendix note 40 infra.
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are made by corporations, "tax neutrality" for present pur-
poses must mean requiring the total United States and foreign tax
burdens to have the same distorting effect as that of the United
States corporate income tax.
Neutrality is not, of course, the only objective governments
seek to achieve, and not infrequently it must yield to other more
important objectives. A convenient way to test a given propo-
sal involving a concession is to ask whether the objective to be
achieved by use of the incentive is valued highly enough to war-
rant spending the waived taxes by granting a subsidy to the firm
receiving the tax relief, keeping in mind that the cost is not
only the amount spent, but also the loss from the resulting dis-
tortion in resource allocation.
The foreign tax credit provisions are designed to further
the objective of neutrality by equalizing the income tax burdens
on capital invested abroad with that on capital invested in the
United States. 42 These provisions permit a credit for certain for-
eign taxes paid against liability for United States taxes, dollar
for dollar. For example, if a firm pays a foreign income tax of
45% of its taxable income, its liability for United States tax will
be reduced to 3% of its taxable income so that its foreign source
income will be taxed at the 48% rate applicable to United States
source income. The credit is available only if the foreign tax is
an "income, war profits, and excess profits" tax or "a tax paid in
lieu of a tax on income, war profits, or excess profits otherwise
generally imposed" by the foreign government. 43
While it is not at all certain that Congress was aware of this
fact when the credit provisions were enacted, there is some justi-
fication for refusing to allow a credit for certain taxes, at least
under some circumstances. For example, if, in any given case
the taxpayer's liability for the foreign tax is greater (in terms of
dollar amount) than its liablity for the United States corporate
income tax, the allowance of a credit for the foreign tax will sub-
stitute its effect for the factor tax effect of the United States cor-
porate income tax. This substitution will violate tax neutrality4
unless, of course, the foreign tax is itself a factor tax on capital.
Also, it is true that allowance of a credit for any type of tax
will result in the same after credit effect of the combined taxes as
that of a corporate income tax, as long as the foreign tax is
smaller in dollar amount than the United States corporate in-
42. See text accompanying Appendix notes 41-44 infra.
43. IRC §§ 901 & 903.
44. See text following Appendix note 44 infta.
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come tax.45 However, since the foreign tax credit provisions do
not turn upon whether the dollar amount of the foreign tax is
greater or less than that of the United States tax, it is arguable
that the credit should be allowed only for factor taxes similar to
the United States corporate income tax. The conclusion is "argu-
able" because it assumes that allowance of a credit for taxes
which are larger than the corporate tax will have a greater dis-
torting effect than the failure to allow a credit for taxes which
are less than the corporate tax-a conclusion that might or might
not be borne out by empirical analysis.
If the conclusion that the credit should be allowed only for
factor taxes similar to the corporate tax is accepted, however, the
question for present purposes becomes whether the Indonesian
tax is such a factor tax. It appears that it is. Like its United
States counterpart, the Indonesian corporate income tax is meas-
ured by gross income,4 6 less the cost of earning that income.4 7
However, no deductions are allowed for amounts paid to, or ac-
cumulated for, shareholders. As a consequence, the tax is meas-
ured by the return to shareholders. As is explained in the Ap-
pendix, this characteristic of the United States corporate in-
come tax causes it to be considered a factor tax on the return to
capital.48 The Indonesian withholding tax on dividends is also
measured by the amount paid to shareholders, 49 and is, there-
45. Id.
46. Article 1.1 of the Indonesian Corporate Income Tax Law pro-
vides in part:
Under the title "Corporation Tax" a tax is levied: (lst) On
profits obtained by a limited liability company ... [and] other
companies or associations, the capital of which is wholly or
partly divided into shares ....
This statute is reprinted in SYcip, GORaES, VELAYO & UTOMO, INDONE-
srq TAX LAws AND REGULATIONS at 6 (1969). (Copy on file with
Mm. L. REV.). Profit is defined by Article 3 of the law to include
among other things, "the sum of the net benefits derived under what-
ever name and in whatever form from the enterprise . . . ." Sycip,
Goams, VELAYO & UTOMO, supra, at 8.
47. Article 4 of the Indonesian Corporate Income Tax Law pro-
vides in part:
To compute the amount of the net benefits as referred to in
Article 3, expenses for the acquisition, collection and mainte-
nance of said benefits shall be deducted from the gross amount
of said benefits.
Sycip, GoRREs, VELAYO & UTOMO, supra note 46, at 9.
48. Appendix at Part III.
49. Article 1 of the Indonesian Tax on Interest, Dividends and
Royalties provides in part:
Under the designation Tax on Interest, Dividends and Royal-
ties, Taxes are levied on revenues, under any name or in
any form, gained from . . . (b) [sihares, profit-shares and
obligations, participating in the division of profits from Lim-
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fore, a factor tax as well. Accordingly, principles of tax neu-
trality will be furthered by the allowance of a credit for both
of these taxes.
B. TAx SPARING AND THE INDONEsrAN PROPOSAL
But what of these taxes if either tax sparing or the KIP pro-
posal being considered by Indonesia is put into effect? In light
of the foregoing, how do tax sparing and the present proposal fare
when tested against the standard of tax neutrality?
Tax sparing appears to be wholly nonneutral. Income from
capital invested in corporations doing business in the United
States is subject to the United States corporate income tax,
whereas income from capital invested in a less developed coun-
try having a tax sparing treaty with the United States (there
are none presently), is not subject to tax in either the United
States or the foreign country. Accordingly, if tax sparing is
adopted, the cost of using capital in the less developed country
will be approximately one half the cost of using capital in the
United States and the allocation of resources will become dis-
torted by excess investments of capital in the less developed
country.
It is extremely difficult for those interested in the develop-
ment of the less developed countries to accept this conclusion. 0
Their reluctance to do so is probably attributable to a number of
factors. First, the preceding discussion may be summarily dis-
missed as nothing more than an extreme example of dry logic
leading to a conclusion which is wholly irreconcilable with ob-
servable facts. The suggestion that tax sparing, or any other tax
incentive for that matter, can make capital investment "exces-
sive" in a country where roads are built by men and women whose
capital consists of the few picks and shovels they share and the
straw basket each uses to transport broken rock, is hard to
accept. It is probable, however, that the fault lies not with the
dry logic but with confusion over the exact meaning of the word
ited Corporations, Commanditair Corporations on shares, and
other corporations, which capital are entirely or partly divided
into shares, domiciled in Indonesia ....
INDoNEsIAN TAx LAW No. 10 (1970) (Amendments and Additions of the
Dividend Tax Law of 1959) (Copy on file with MINN. L. RE.). Article
3A of that law provides:
With "revenues" as mentioned in article 1, letter (b) is meant
among others: (a) profit shares either direct or indirect,
under any name or in any form ....
INDoNmsAw TAx LAw No. 10 (1970) supra.
50. See Tax Treaties, supra note 9, at 9-10, 22-23.
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"excessive" when used in this context. Tax neutralists readily
would concede that tax sparing would not make capital invest-
ment excessive in the sense that the amount invested in a sparing
country would exceed the country's needs--or in any sense be
adequate for these purposes. Capital investment would be ex-
cessive in the sense that under conditions existing in the sparing
country, the additional capital that would be attracted to the
country due to sparing would be less productive than it would
have been were it invested elsewhere.
The second criticism is more practical than theoretical. It
consists of the observation that neutrality, as previously defined,
is bound to work systematically against the well being of the in-
habitants of less developed countries. Investment conditions in
less developed countries are, of course, generally inferior to those
in the developed countries. If all governments are now to adopt
policies of neutrality it is likely that most capital investment will
gravitate toward the developed countries, leaving the less devel-
oped countries just that-less developed.
Third, the disenchantment of those concerned with the well
being of the inhabitants of the less developed countries may be
fortified by the underlying suspicion that the arguments support-
ing neutrality do not tell the whole story. The advantageous
investment conditions in the developed countries do not result
entirely (or in some cases at all) from natural economic condi-
tions but rather from the systematic efforts of the governments of
the developed countries to cause investment conditions there to
be superior to those existing elsewhere. The more cynical of
these observers might note that our great affection for neutral-
ity has developed only after the United States has established a
seemingly insurmountable lead in the development of the invest-
ment conditions at home. Perhaps even more important for
present purposes is that even under these conditions, our adher-
ence to neutrality extends only to the tax collection side of gov-
ernment activity since our government continues to spend funds
in an effort to improve investment conditions in this country
in what is obviously not, and is not intended to be, a neutral
fashion.
Finally, if most future capital investment is channeled into
the developed countries, the governments of these countries will
continue to receive the revenues which they can use to improve
investment conditions there, while corresponding conditions in
less developed countries may progress much more slowly, stag-
nate, or even deteriorate.
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In short: (1) even complete neutrality now would cause most
capital to stay within the developed countries; (2) the developed
countries have no intention of adhering to neutrality insofar as
government spending is concerned-nor is it here suggested that
they should do so; and (3) the cumulative effect of these two
conclusions will almost inevitably mean that future investments,
the revenues therefrom, and therefore the improved conditions
thereby made available all will stay within the developed coun-
tries.
Most of these criticisms are aimed at the results that policies
of neutrality may produce, rather than at the theoretical sound-
ness of the analysis supporting these policies. However, these
criticisms also point up a flaw in the analysis, by suggesting that
neutralists who look only to taxes may be taking too narrow a
view. Taxes are only half of the fiscal picture. Not only from
the standpoint of the development of the less developed coun-
tries, but also from the standpoint of maximizing world-wide
production, should not the concept of neutrality be broadened
to cover both sides of the fiscal picture? In other words, should
the objective be government neutrality rather than tax neutral-
ity?
Stated in its extreme form, government neutrality would re-
quire the elimination of all government influence so that invest-
ment decisions will be based on "natural" economic conditions.
Hence, if unequal benefits (government services and facilities)
exist, they must be neutralized by unequal burdens (taxes). Any-
thing less will distort the deployment of resources to investments
which have been favored with government spending. It seems
clear that government neutrality is wholly unsupportable as a do-
mestic policy. Its invalidity is not so clear when considered
in the context of international investment, however.
Government expenditures are designed, of course, to accom-
plish a number of ends, some of which may result in sacrificing
economic efficiency to attain other national goals and some of
which, although seeking generally to further economic produc-
tion, may increase the attractiveness of particular potential in-
vestments much more than others. In neither case would it be
sensible to offset the effect of government expenditures with tax
incentives.
For example, if a highway affords a competitive advantage to
service stations established nearby, it would be inefficient to pro-
vide tax concessions to a firm which locates it operations
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elsewhere. Once the highway is established, economic output
will be maximized only if investors take advantage of the result-
ing benefits. Similarly, if the government tries to encourage
the young to improve their education by providing subsidies for
those that remain in school, it would be counterproductive to then
neutralize this effort by providing tax "relief" to high school
dropouts. In the first of these examples, the tax concession would
lower economic productivity. In the second, it would frustrate
the government efforts to achieve an objective through its spend-
ing programs. Obviously, neither would be sensible.
When the situation is considered from an international stand-
point, however, several complications are introduced since there
are at least two governments either or both of which may be
participating in either of two capacities. (Under tax sparing, for
example, both the foreign and United States governments are
taxing authorities which may be considered to have waived taxes;
under the KIP proposal, the Indonesian government is a gov-
ernment disposing of revenues for the construction of infrastruc-
ture, while the United States is a taxing authority which has
granted a credit for a foreign tax.) No longer is there a single
government whose policies determine both the manner in which
all government funds are to be spent and the objectives that are
to be served by the system of taxation. Here the arguments
against some form of governmental neutrality are substan-
tially less clear.
Consider tax sparing for example. If tax sparing is viewed
as a tax incentive granted by the United States, the arguments
used against domestic government neutrality appear to be appli-
cable.51 The argument would be that both past and prospective
51. On the national level the collection of taxes and expenditures
of the resulting revenues are probably redistributional, not only at
the personal level but at the regional level as well. R. NuRsKE, supra
note 4, at 78-79. Nurske points out that although the "point is hard to
verify" it appears that a system based on progressive income tax "tends
automatically to produce transfers . . . from the richer to the poorer
regions within a given country." Id. at 78. His assumption is that
"expenditure on public works and welfare is approximately the same
per head of the population in all regions, but that taxation is propor-
tional to income [or to make the] point . . . more strongly . . . pro-
gressive." Id.
This redistributional effect does not occur internationally, however.
The transfer of resources from rich countries to poor countries is com-
paratively low. For example, the percentages of total budget ex-
penditure of specified countries that consist of loans and grants to the
less developed countries and to the multilateral agencies for the year
1965 were as follows: France: 3.74%; United States: 2.78%; Ger-
many: 1.75%; Canada: 1.59%; U.K.: 1.43%. The External Financing
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government spending by the United States reflect United States
policies internationally as well as nationally. If so, tax con-
cessions must not act at cross-purposes with, or tend to neu-
tralize the effects of our government's policies as reflected in
the manner in which government funds are spent. Thus, if the
United States government attempts to increase productivity in
the United States by providing better transportation facilities
and is not willing to spend a corresponding amount of funds
for the construction of roads, piers or bridges in the jungles of
Borneo, it should not give special tax treatment to United States
firms, or their foreign subsidiaries, if they do so.
While this would appear to be a perfectly reasonable posi-
tion to take if sparing is to be considered as a grant by the United
States of a tax concession (in which case the only relevant
considerations are those of United States governmental policy),
it is suggested that this is not the only, nor necessarily the
proper, way to characterize sparing.
Why must tax sparing be regarded as a grant by the United
States of a tax incentive? Why cannot tax sparing be viewed as
tax collection by Indonesia followed by a contribution of a like
amount of funds to the tax-paying firm for the purposes of in-
ducing it to invest in Indonesia?52 In substance, incentives and
direct expenditures accomplish exactly the same thing-the pro-
of Economic Development, U. N. Doc. E/4438 at 147 (table 40) (1968).
The difference in the amounts of revenues collected and spent
by the governments of the richer and poorer countries is so substan-
tial that it is clear that the latter cannot begin to catch up or even pre-
vent the gap from widening under existing conditions. Consider the
following statistics. The per capita expenditures of federal, state and
local governments in the United States totalled over 10 times the entire
per capita income of those less developed countries housing over one
half of the world's population. See STATISTICAL YnAR Boon, supra
note 3, at 81 (table 18).
52. It is not unusual for governments in the United States to con-
tribute funds to firms they wish to establish in an area. The con-
tribution is tax free to the recipient corporation if the items
contributed to [it] by a governmental unit [are contributed)
for the purpose of inducing the corporation to locate its busi-
ness in a particular community, or for the purpose of enabling
the corporation to expand its operating facilities.
Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956). The corporation takes a zero basis in
any property purchased with the contributed funds. IRC § 362(c).
Under the present proposal the taxpayer never acquires ownership of
the facilities and thus there are no basis questions. If tax sparing is
considered the payment of a tax followed by a contribution to capi-
tal, the firm would have a zero basis in the assets acquired with the
spared tax. See generally, Landis, Contributions to Capital of Cor-
porations, 24 TAx L. REv. 241 (1969); Note, Taxation of Nonshareholder
Contributions to Corporate Capital, 82 HARv. L. REv. 619 (1969).
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vision of financial assistance by the government." If sparing is
viewed in this manner, the desirability of providing governmental
assistance to the investor becomes a question to be resolved in
light of Indonesian governmental policy, not of United States pol-
icy. From a more mechanical standpoint, the United States will
be considered to have granted a credit for a tax paid to Indo-
nesia and will not be considered to have offered a tax concession
to the firm. In effect, this is the substance of the KIP proposal:
explicitly cause the assistance to take place at the Indonesian ex-
penditure level so that the remaining consequences follow as a
matter of course.
It is apparent that the acceptability of tax sparing and the
KIP proposal depends upon whether they are appraised from the
standpoint of government spending policy of the United States or
that of the less developed country. If viewed from the former
standpoint, tax sparing in particular, but to some extent the KIP
proposal as well, appears to be a rather foolish tax concession
grant by the United States for a purpose this government would
not support by direct spending. If considered from the stand-
point of the less developed country, tax sparing becomes a sensi-
ble tax concession grant6 4 for a purpose very much favored by the
less developed country.
By adopting the tax credit method of avoiding double tax,
this country has made the fundamental decision that the taxing
jurisdiction from which income has its source shall have the first
claim to tax that income and the concomitant right to spend the
resulting revenues in accordance with its governmental policies.
It is submitted that principles of tax neutrality do not require
a different result, even if the resulting revenues are used to sub-
sidize projects designed to further the economic development of
the source country. It is submitted further that this result
should obtain whether or not the subsidy is provided directly or
through tax incentives.
The United States does not normally judge the wisdom of a
53. For an extensive discussion of this point, see Surrey, Tax In-
centives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Com-
parison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. Rsv. 705
(1970). This is not to suggest that Professor Surrey views the choice
between tax incentives or direct subsidies indifferently. He argues
persuasively that direct subsidies are usually far preferable to tax
incentives.
54. As pointed out in note 53 supra, persuasive arguments can be
made that subsidies are preferable to tax incentives. Presumably these
arguments should be considered by a less developed country choos-
ing between these two means of providing government assistance.
[Vol. 56:755
TAX TREATIES
foreign government's spending programs when deciding whether
to grant a credit for foreign income taxes. For example, taxes
raised by governments who advocate and support waging war
against friendly nations remain fully creditable.55 However,
even if such an inquiry were made, subsidizing foreign (or do-
mestic) investments does not seem objectionable. Such spending
is clearly not neutral, but government spending seldom is. As
noted above, the United States spends vast amounts of govern-
ment funds on projects designed to further our economic develop-
ment and frequently subsidizes the operations of business firms.
How then can the United States object to such spending or subsi-
dization by less developed countries? Moreover, even if one ob-
jects to some or all of the subsidies granted by the United
States, it seems absurd to suggest that all less developed coun-
tries are thereby precluded from subsidizing investment in their
countries. Hopefully, at least, no one will suggest that consid-
erations of our tax policy require this result.
Since direct subsidies and tax concessions are in substance the
same from the Indonesian government standpoint, why is tax
sparing bad? It appears to be a non-neutral tax concession
working at cross-purposes with our spending policies only if it is
considered a tax waiver by the United States. If it is considered a
grant of a credit for the equivalent of a tax paid to Indonesia fol-
lowed by the expenditure in Indonesia of the resulting funds, it
loses its status as a tax concession. This latter characterization,
and only this characterization, is consistent with the conclu-
sion that Indonesian level tax concessions and subsidies are in
substance the same.
The foregoing analysis is not so much a defense of govern-
ment neutrality as a use of that concept to force the analysis to
focus on both sides of the fiscal picture. By doing so it can be seen
that those who resist tax sparing on grounds of neutrality may be
taking inconsistent positions. The first position is that a govern-
ment should not spend funds through grants of tax concessions
when it would not spend the funds for the same purpose directly.
No distinction should be drawn between spending funds directly
and spending funds through tax concessions. The second position
is that a credit should be granted when foreign funds are spent
directly but not when they are spent through tax concessions,
which means that a distinction is being drawn between these two
55. Rev. RuL 68-552, 1968-2 CmvL BuLL. 306 (Libya); Rev. Rul.
55-296, 1955-1 CUM. BuLL. 386 (Saudi Arabia).
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forms of government spending. The first proposition is correct
but the second is wrong.
However, the grant of a tax credit is not a grant of a tax
concession (so that the first of the above propositions is not ap-
plicable to the present problem), but is rather simply one means
of resolving the problem of conflicting jurisdictions taxing the
same income. The United States government should grant a
credit if the foreign country exercises its jurisdiction to tax in-
come whether this exercise is through overt taxation and spend-
ing or through the grant of a tax concession.
III. CONCLUSION
The KIP proposal being considered by Indonesia represents
an effort to attract capital and technology to that country by
using income taxes paid by the investor to Indonesia to defray
some of the costs of establishing Indonesian infrastructure. The
principal question considered in this article is whether this pro-
posal violates principles of tax neutrality. It has been demon-
strated that taxes are neutral only if firms are subjected to uni-
form tax burdens so that capital investment decisions are unaf-
fected by questions of taxation. The objective to be furthered
by tax neutrality is the maximization of the economic productivity
of the world. Tax neutrality should be adhered to unless other
objectives are, under the circumstances in question, more impor-
tant.
A convenient way to test a given proposal involving a con-
cession is to ask whether the objective to be achieved by use of
the incentive is valued highly enough to warrant spending the
waived taxes by granting a subsidy to the firm receiving the tax
relief, keeping in mind that the cost consists not only of the
amount spent, but also the loss caused by diverting the firm's re-
sources from the use they would pursue if influenced only by
prices and markets. Since the corporate income tax in the
United States is itself not neutral, neutrality can be maintained
within the corporate sector only if foreign taxes influence firms
in the same manner that firms are influenced by the corporate in-
come tax.
This article set forth various objections to tax neutrality
from the standpoint of less developed countries. One objection
relates to the failure of tax neutrality to consider both sides
of the fiscal picture. When both tax collection and government
spending are considered, it appears that while tax sparing cannot
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be defended on grounds of neutrality from the standpoint of tax
collection, it might nevertheless be justifiable as the equivalent
of non-neutral government spending. As such, it (along with
other tax concessions) should be considered acceptable if, but
only if, it could be justified as a direct expenditure of govern-
ment funds for the same purposes.
Finally, in the international context the wisdom of spending
government funds for any specific purpose and in any given man-
ner (i.e., direct spending versus tax concessions), must be tested
by the government policies of the country in which the income
has its source. Thus, if the Indonesian government concludes that
its policies favor spending funds to construct a given facility,
the United States should not refuse to grant a credit for the tax
funds used therefor on the grounds that the United States would
not itself spendits funds for the same purpose.
It should be emphasized that, while tax sparing and the KIP
proposal are similar in many basic respects, they should not be
regarded as equivalent for all purposes. For example, as noted
previously, tax sparing when tied to tax holidays of very short
duration can produce inequitable excess short term profits. In
addition, it seems likely that tax sparing might be used more
indiscriminately than the Indonesian proposal because its costs in
terms of local government funds is not so apparent. In other
words, tax sparing might be used even though the government of
the less developed country would not spend funds for the same
purpose. For these and other reasons previously considered, the
KIP proposal being considered by Indonesia is preferable to tax
sparing.
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APPENDIX
I. THE STANDARD: CONSUMER WELFARE
The objective, and thus the standard against which an econ-
omy's performance is measured, is the maximization of consumer
welfare, which means simply maximizing the utility and satis-
faction consumers derive from the economy's output.' This prob-
ably sounds more materialistic than it is since "consumers" in-
clude not just individuals purchasing T.V. sets, but schools pur-
chasing textbooks, universities acquiring the (sometimes) crea-
tive efforts of scholars and charities acquiring necessities for the
disadvantaged.
The first step is to determine the significance of prices. This
is accomplished through an analysis of consumer behavior. Econ-
omists assume that consumers seek to maximize the satisfaction
they realize from the goods and services they purchase with
their limited budgets. Consumers preparing budgets are uncon-
sciously trying to adjust their spending to the point where the
satisfaction gained from spending $1 more on a given good or
service will exactly equal the satisfaction lost from spending $1
less on each and all other goods and services.2 That is, when a
purchaser with a finite budget spends $1 for good A, he has, of
course, $1 less to spend elsewhere. If upon re-examining his
budget he finds that the satisfaction gained from spending one
additional dollar on good A was less than the satisfaction lost by
not spending that dollar on good B, he can increase his total
satisfaction simply by shifting at least $1 from A to B. Only
when the satisfaction gained from an increase in the amount
spent for A equals exactly the satisfaction lost from an equal de-
crease in the amount spent on B (and all other goods) is the con-
1. Hopefully, simplifications such as this and others which follow
will not, by failing to point out all the qualifications necessary to make
the statement wholly accurate, lead the reader to reject the entire an-
alysis. For example, tax neutralists are neither advocating the max-
imization of consumer satisfaction at the expense of our environment
nor maintaining that all health and safety standards be abandoned
even though this might maximize productivity. The point is rather
that taxes should not interfere with the free play of economic forces
unless they serve some purpose which is valued more highly than the
maximization of consumer satisfaction. It follows that if the function of
the tax in question is solely to raise revenue, the tax should nonethe-
less interfere with the free play of economic forces as little as possible.
2. J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 164 (1952) [hereinafter cited as BAIN];
D. WATSON, PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES 87 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as WATSON].
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sumer unable to improve his position be rearranging his budget.
This conclusion provides important information concerning the
significance of prices.
Implicit in the foregoing is the assumption that shifts in
spending will tend to eliminate the differences in satisfaction
realized from the goods and services in question. Otherwise, the
consumer might never reach the point where one dollar more
spent on one good will yield the same increase in satisfaction as
that lost from $1 less spent on other goods. Economists have con-
cluded that a concept they call the "law of declining marginal
utility" indicates that this will, in fact, occur. This concept is
based on the observation that the satisfaction a person will real-
ize from a unit of goods or service will vary depending on the
quantity of that commodity he has acquired previously. Specif-
ically, the concept holds that the greater the quantity of a good
or service a consumer has in hand, the lower the value one addi-
tional unit will have to him.3 Compare, for example, the impor-
tance of a quart of water to a person allowed two quarts per day
to the almost negligible value usually associated with a single
quart of the relatively plentiful supply of water most people
enjoy in this country.4 Declining marginal utility is said to be a
common phenomenon observed by everyone in everyday life.5
Applied to the analysis here it shows that when a consumer
decreases the amount spent on good A and increases the amount
spent on B, each of the fewer dollars spent on the disfavored good
A will yield more satisfaction while at the same time each of the
more numerous dollars spent on the favored good B will yield
less satisfaction. Eventually the consumer will reach the
point where $1 more or less spent on each and every good or
service will increase or decrese his satisfaction by the same
amount whereupon no further changes in his budget should be
made.
This conclusion helps explain the significance of prices since
it demonstrates that when a consumer spends $20 on good A,
and $10 on good B, each one of the $20 spent on good A will be
yielding the same satisfaction as each one of the $10 spent on
good B. Accordingly, the consumer has placed a value, in terms
3. G. SmIGLER, TnE TnEORY OF PRiCE 51 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as STIGLER]; WATSON, supra note 2, at 60.
4. STIGLER, supra note 3, at 51; WATSON, supra note 2, at 63.
Diminishing marginal utility is the reason demand curves commonly
slope downward from left to right. WATSoN, supra note 2, at 66.
5. WATSOn, supra note 2, at 62, 63.
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of capacity to give satisfaction, on good A which is twice the
value he assigns to good B. In short, price is a direct reflection
of capacity to yield consumer satisfaction. Since consumers are
considered fungible, it follows that the goal of maximizing con-
sumer satisfaction can be realized if and only if the value, in
terms of the price consumers will pay, of the economy's output
is maximized.
The next step is to see how resource owners respond to
prices. Here again the key is each individual's desire to in-
crease his material welfare. If a given productive resource (the
labors of a single individual for example) can produce good A
in less than twice the time it can produce good B, it will help
maximize the economy's output by doing so in a situation such
as the above example in which consumers will pay $20 for good A
and $10 for good B.
Happily, the resource owner will also maximize his income
by doing so, for since it takes less than twice the time to produce
good A for which he will be paid $20, than it does to produce
good B for which he will be paid $10, he obviously will maxi-
mize his income if he produces A rather than B-at least if it is
assumed that the resource owner receives that which the con-
sumer is willing to pay. Just as it was earlier assumed that con-
sumers will seek to maximize the enjoyment they realize from
their purchases, it is here assumed that resource owners (includ-
6. Some may object on the ground that the price only shows the
value to consumers of the 999th quart of water, for example, since
price reflects the trade-off value consumers place on one quart of
water after they have obtained 998 quarts. Put another way, price does
show the value of the first and second quarts of water which must be
consumed each day to sustain life.
These are accurate observations. However, consumers trying to
maximize satisfaction (and, therefore, policy makers trying to maxi-
mize total consumer satisfaction) should not permit this to influence
them. Consumers must take the economy as they find it. They are
offered 999 quarts per person at a tiny fraction of a cent per quart.
They are also being offered a pair of shoes which costs $40 per pair.
Consumers would be foolish to conclude that since they value their
lives more than warm, dry feet they should spend $20 or more for
water. Rather, they should conclude that as long as they are offered
999 quarts of water at a fraction of a cent per quart, they should spend
two or three cents for the 999 quarts. If the quantity offered at a
fraction of a cent per quart drops, and particularly if it drops to two or
three quarts per day, they must of course increase the amount they are
willing to spend for water.
A policy maker is in substantially the same position. The rele-
vant question is, in light of the circumstances as they presently exist,
how will increases or decreases in the quantity produced of various
goods and services affect consumer satisfaction?
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ing individuals capable of performing services) will try to maxi-
mize incomes.7 In short, resource owners seeking to maximize
their return will pursue the highest prices obtainable. Since
price is a direct reflection of the capacity to yield satisfaction, it
follows that by doing so resource owners will be producing those
goods which maximize consumer satisfaction.8
The economy is not, of course, as simple as the foregoing
would suggest because most resource owners do not sell their
services or the use of their capital directly to the public. Rather
they sell to firms9 which, in turn, use the capital and labor they
purchase to produce goods and services for the public.
Probably most, but certainly not all, economists assume that
firms seek to maximize profits. Watson states that "[t] he as-
sumption of profit maximization for firms is symmetrical with
the assumption of utility maximization for consumers."10  The
important question for present purposes is whether firms seeking
to maximize profits equate the price consumers pay for the goods
and services produced by the firm with the amount paid for the
use of the resources which produced the goods or services. Econ-
omists have concluded that firms do. Their conclusion is based
upon their analysis of how firms respond to the two major prob-
lems that confront them: (1) what quantity of goods or serv-
ices to produce; and (2) the method of production, including the
appropriate proportion of men and machines.
7. This is an oversimplification, of course. For example, working
conditions and prestige associated with various positions affect labor's
choice of employment and risk affects the investment of capital. See
STiGLER, supra note 3, at 257-63 (discussing the former). See also A.
Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax, 70 J. POL.
ECON. 215, 217 (1962); P SAMUSON, EcoNoMIcs 595-96 (8th ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as SAmuESON] (discussing the latter). In
addition, resource owners may be unaware of many opportunities or
may not have the mobility needed to take advantage of them. Never-
theless, it is thought that the dominant force motivating labor to
work and owners of capital to invest is the expectation of compensa-
tion and that the principal criterion used in selecting the place of
investment or employment will be the rate of return.
8. Of course, the economy will never reach this condition. Con-
sumers' tastes are constantly changing. New products and productive
techniques are constantly being developed. The important thing is
that the economy is constantly adjusting toward this end.
9. Economists refer to all forms of business organizations-pro-
prietorships, partnerships, corporations, etc.---as "firms." WATSON, su-
pra note 2, at 146-47. For an economic discussion of the various forms
a business organization may assume, see SAmumsoN, supra note 7,
at 77-95.
10. WATSON, supra note 2, at 147. A brief look at firms which
pursue objectives other than profit maximization will be undertaken
later.
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To maximize profits a firm should select that level of pro-
duction at which any increase in the quantity produced will cost
exactly that which it yields (in the language of economists, mar-
ginal cost must equal marginal revenue)." That is, as long as
increases in output generate more additional revenue than ad-
ditional cost, the firm will increase its profits by expanding out-
put. Only when the firm reaches the point where any increase
in production increases revenues by exactly the same amount
that it increases costs will expansion no longer be justified.
This simple observation appeals to common sense, but there
are certain complications which underlie it. First, what is
meant by "cost"? Cost must, of course, include amounts paid
others for the labor or capital they supply. Wages to the firm's
employees, interest to banks, and rent to lessors are all in-
cluded. Also included, however, is the return the owners of the
firm could have received if the capital or labor they have in-
vested were invested elsewhere. Assume, for example, that the
firm is a sole proprietorship and that corporate stocks which
represent the same risk to an investor as ownership of the firm
represents to the proprietor are yielding 10%. Under these cir-
cumstances, the "cost" to the proprietor of investing his capital
in the firm is the amount lost by not investing in corporate
stock. It follows that the cost of capital includes that which one
normally considers a firm's profit. 1 2 To some extent this is a
matter of semantics. One could say that the "cost" of capital in-
cludes a normal or competitive rate of return to capital. On the
other hand, one could say that capital supplied by the owner of
the firm has no cost but that the firm must earn a normal profit
for its owner. The former approach is preferable since it assigns
the amount that must be earned to compensate the owners for the
use of their capital directly to the use of that capital. For ex-
11. BAIN, supra note 2, at 143-44; WATSON, supra note 2, at 257-58.
If price stays above average cost, new firms will enter; if it falls be-
low, some will leave. BAIN, supra note 2, at 143-44. As the industry
expands or contracts, industry costs may rise or drop. See id. at
147; SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 450-52; STIGLER, supra note 3, at
151, 166-67. Price may react similarly. BAIN, supra note 2, at 139.
Finally, average costs will reach price and no "excess" profits will
exist. Id. at 156, 162; SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 446, 448. As
Samuelson describes it, equilibrium will be reached when long-term
marginal costs equal average costs and these in turn equal price.
SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 446.
12. As will be shown below, a firm which earns more than the
amount needed to meet its costs will be said to be earning an "ex-
cess" profit. See also note 11 supra.
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ample, the rule for profit maximization could not be stated so
simply if the cost of capital were not explicitly recognized.
The second complication underlying the profit maximizing
rule is the assumption that as output expands costs will rise
relative to the price at which goods will sell. In an industry in
which perfect competition prevails,1 3 the firm will be faced with
prices which remain constant regardless of the quantity of goods
or services produced by the firm.14 However, the cost of produc-
ing each additional unit will rise as the quantity of output in-
creases. 15 Under these conditions, the firm should set the level
of production at the point where any increase in the quantity
produced will increase cost by exactly the amount it will in-
crease revenues.'8 This is common sense. If a firm goes beyond
that point by hiring labor which cost it $1.01 more in wages,
for example, by hypothesis the increased production will increase
revenues by less than $1.01. Similarly, if the shareholders in-
vest an additional $10.10, they will, if their capital gains would
yield a 10% return if invested elsewhere, have given up a return
of $1.01. Yet the firm's revenues will increase less than $1.01.
Both steps will, by costing more than they yield, reduce profits
and thus should be avoided. On the other hand, if the firm re-
duces production, again by hypothesis, it will have reduced rev-
enues by more than it reduced costs. Obviously, this too will re-
duce profits and similarly should be avoided.
If a corporation is able to generate "excess" profits (a return
which exceeds the amount foregone by shareholders by not in-
vesting elsewhere), the excess will go the shareholders as the
owners of the residual interest in the firm. The shareholders will
earn not only the 10% return available elsewhere, but an addi-
tional profit as well. If this occurs, others with capital will be
attracted to this industry by its higher return. Accordingly, they
will invest capital in the industry and expand industry output. 17
The declining marginal utility to consumers of the increased in-
dustry. output will reduce its price until finally the point is
13. See SAmumsoN, supra note 7, at 39, 67-68, 450; WATsON, supra
note 2, at 117.
14. See note 10 supra; BAwn, supra note 2, at 132; STIGLm, supra
note 3, at 138; WATSON, supra note 2, at 235.
15. SAmumsoZ, supra note 7, at 462; STIGLER, supra note 3, at 181;
WATSON, supra note 2, at 238. More precisely, if long term marginal
costs of firms do not rise, the industry will not be competitive. Vari-
ous reasons why costs may rise are set forth in STIGLR, supra note 3,
at 155-58.
16. See note 11 supra.
17. Id.
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reached at which no firm is earning an excess profit.18 At this
point, the link between resource owners and consumers has been
partially established. The ultimate objective is to cause re-
sources to be employed in producing those goods and services
which yield the maximum satisfaction to consumers. In a
simple economy each resource owner will seek to invest his re-
source where it will receive the highest monetary return con-
sistent with the risk incurred. Since the return to the resource
owner is the price being paid by the consumer, and since this
price reflects the capacity of the item to yield satisfaction to
him, the resource owner must maximize consumer satisfaction
if he is to maximize his return. It is essential, therefore, that
each $1 paid by consumers represents $1 received by the re-
source owners who produced the good or service.
This analysis illustrates that a firm will produce at the level
where the cost of producing one additional unit is exactly equal
to its price, and that if a firm earns an excess profit, other firms
will enter the industry and eliminate the profit. This means that
the amount the firms are receiving for the sale of their goods or
services will exactly equal the cost. Thus, in the aggregate, the
objective has been reached since, if all resources employed by
a firm are lumped together, the amount resource owners are
receiving for producing a good or service will be exactly equal to
the amount consumers are paying therefor.
But what if a firm's resources are not lumped together? Is
it not possible the firms are using resources in the wrong pro-
portions so that the wages paid by the firm may exceed the value
of labor's contribution, while the cost of capital may be less than
capital's contribution to production? The question seems to in-
vite an esoteric discussion of the relative contributions to pro-
ductivity of labor and capital, but fortunately it need not.
An example may be helpful. Assume that firms X and Y are
both producing at the profit maximizing level. Assume also that
firm X is using capital and labor in such proportions that firing a
unit of labor costing $1 will decrease the value of production by
$.90 whereas decreasing the amount of capital spent by $1 will
decrease the value of production by $1.10. Assume also that
firm Y is in just the opposite position so that cutting back labor
costing $1 will decrease the value of production by $1.10 and cut-
ting back on the use of capital by $1 will decrease the value of
production by $.90. If this were to occur (and it is likely that
18. Id.
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similar situations arise all the time) total production in the econ-
omy could be increased by shifting one dollar's worth of labor
from X (thereby decreasing the value of production by $.90) to Y
(where it will increase the value of production by $1.10), and
shifting capital costing $1 from Y to X (with the same effect).
Happily, both firms in pursuing their individual efforts to
maximize profits, will be changing the proportions in which they
used capital and labor. Firm X can increase its total profits by
$.20 by spending at least $1 more for capital and $1 less for labor.
(The additional dollar spent for capital will increase the value
of production by $1.10, whereas the decrease in the use of labor
will decrease the value of production by only $.90.) Similarly,
firm Y can increase the value of its output $.20 by substituting
labor for capital. Thus, each firm, acting in pursuit of its own
self interest and without conscious regard to the impact of its
actions on the economy as a whole, will be seeking an exchange
of resources which will maximize the value of the economy's
output.
Once again, two unstated premises underlie the foregoing
analysis. The first is that resources can be used in different pro-
portions. That is, firm X in the above example can substitute
capital for labor. Economists are satisfied that productive re-
sources usually can be used interchangeably to a degree.19 This
is a matter of technology and, while it is true that some capi-
tal equipment may be indispensable in some industries (e.g., air
transportation and radio broadcasting), it is undoubtedly possi-
ble to use more men and fewer machines in some facets of the op-
eration even in these industries.2 0
The foregoing example also assumes that substituting capi-
tal for labor will tend to equalize the productivity of these two
resources. Economists have concluded from everyday observa-
tions that this will in fact occur. For example, hiring one man
adds more to the productivity of a firm whose assets are a sin-
gle shovel and a single acre of land if he is the first rather
19. STIGLEP, supra note 3, at 115, 117-18; WATSON, supra note 2, at
177.
20. If, in a given industry, technological conditions are such that
resources cannot be substituted for one another, the separate cost of
each resource becomes insignificant to the firm and the economy as a
whole. Under such circumstances, neither capital nor labor taken sep-
arately can make any contribution to production in the industry. Thus,
since their contribution to production is joint, the sole question is
whether one dollar spent on hiring them jointly builds a product worth
one dollar.
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than the tenth man; the latter would probably just get in the
way.21 Therefore, it appears that the firm can usually substi-
tute capital and labor for one another and that as it does so
each unit of the resource which is being added will add pro-
gressively less to production and each unit of the resource which
is being removed will reduce production by progressively greater
amounts. Return to firm X in the above example as it shifts
from labor to capital; the former will become more, and the lat-
ter less, productive. Firm X will find that substituting capital
for labor will continue to be advantageous until the value of
the additional output resulting from spending $1 more on cap-
ital is equal to the value of the decreased production resulting
from $1 less on labor.
The link between resources and consumers is now complete.
Each firm must select the level of production at which the cost
of producing one more unit will equal its price. Excess profits
will be absorbed by competitive firms entering profitable indus-
tries and losses will be eliminated because some firms will aban-
don distressed industries. Consequently, the resource owners,
in the aggregate, will be paid exactly the price the firm re-
ceives for the output. In addition, each firm must use capital
and labor in such proportions that increasing or decreasing the
amount spent on each by $1 will either increase or decrease the
value of output by the same amount. It follows that the amounts
being paid to resource owners are directly proportionate to
the contribution of that resource to the firm's production. Fin-
ally, since the entire value of the firm's production is paid to
resource owners, it follows that each resource owner receives
the value to consumers of that portion of the firm's output
its resource produces.
In brief summary, the objective is to maximize consumer
welfare, that is, maximize the satisfaction consumers realize
from the goods and services produced by the economy. An
analysis of consumer behavior discloses that price can be ac-
21. Economists refer to this phenomenon as the "law of diminish-
ing returns." As Professor Samuelson puts it:
The Law of Diminishing Returns: An increase in some inputs
relative to other fixed inputs will in a given state of tech-
nology, cause total output to increase; but after a point the
extra output resulting from the same additions of extra input is
likely to become less and less. This falling off of extra returns
is a consequence of the fact that the new "doses" of the vary-
ing resources have less and less of the fixed resources to work
with.
SAMUELSON, supra note 7, at 25. See also BAIN, supra note 2, at
101-04; STIGLER, at 122; WATSON, at 160-65, 168-69, 171.
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cepted as a direct reflection of the capacity of goods to yield
consumer satisfaction. A study of the probable actions of re-
source owners indicates that their efforts to maximize their re-
turn will encourage them to produce goods which yield the high-
est price and therefore the maximum consumer satisfaction.
Consumer welfare will be maximized, therefore, if a direct link
can be established between the amount consumers will pay and
the amount resource owners will receive so that the former re-
ceive that which the latter pay. Finally, an analysis of profit
maximizing firms operating in perfect competition shows that
these firms will establish this link.
This then is the case for tax neutralists: The economy will
tend to maximize consumer welfare if economic forces are al-
lowed free play; taxes should not, therefore, be permitted to
interfere with these forces. In other words, taxes must remain
neutral.
H. THE REAL WORLD
The previous section speaks of rational, calculating, fully-
informed, unemotional factor owners, managers and consumers,
each moving with the deliberate precision we all hope is pos-
sessed by skilled surgeons. These conditions are hardly those
we have learned to expect in the world. A more realistic de-
scription of economic life would characterize the actions of the
participants as a process of "groping. -" 2 2  Certainly most peo-
ple will at some time stupidly, ignorantly or stubbornly refuse
to take advantage of an opportunity which economists expect
them to seize. But any system must accept these and other
human failings. More to the point perhaps is the fact that even
though some distortions creep in due to these deficiencies, there
is no reason to introduce other distortions through bad tax leg-
islation.
The importance of the above analysis is that it demonstrates
that economic pressures on each individual (whether he is a fac-
tor owner, a firm manager or a consumer) seeking to advance
his self interest will lead him to act in a manner which tends
to maximize the general welfare of all. Each person in pursu-
ing his self interest, when and to the extent he recognizes an
opportunity to improve his position by receiving a higher re-
turn, increasing profits, or heightening his satisfaction from con-
sumption, will act in furtherance of the general welfare when he
22. This is Walras' characterization. WATSON, supra note 2, at
272-75.
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attempts to seize the opportunity. It is not, therefore, neces-
sary for tax neutralists to assume that only if all persons act in
the calculating and deliberate manner attributed to them in the
preceding discussion will the economic system function.
With these conclusions in mind, it is now possible to consider
the effect of taxes on the behavior of firms.
A. TAxEs
The following traces the impact of certain taxes on the allo-
cation of resources.23 Some taxes have no effect on the behavior
of firms and the allocation of resources. If the measure of a
tax is noneconomic (e.g., a tax imposed at a uniform rate on
everyone living on a given date), it will not affect economic
decisions. Such a tax is neutral. In addition, some taxes whose
measures are economic (e.g., an income tax imposed uniformly
on all forms of income) will not affect the allocation of re-
sources even though they may affect work-leisure or invest-
ment-consumption decisions. The neutrality of such an income
tax is apparent from the discussion below concerning the distort-
ing effect of income taxes which are not imposed on all forms
of income. For present purposes, a tax which does not affect
the allocation of resources among competing forms of employ-
ment will be considered neutral even though it may affect work-
leisure or consumption-savings decisions.
There are taxes, however, which do affect the allocation of
resources in one of two ways. These effects on resource alloca-
tion will be categorized as (1) an excise tax effect and (2) a fac-
tor tax effect.
1. Excise Tax Effect
For present purposes, an excise tax is defined as a tax "im-
posed upon the production or sale of [some, but not all] com-
modities or related groups of commodities. ' 24 If no excise tax
is imposed, all firms will be equating total costs with total reve-
nues and they will not therefore be able to absorb a tax with-
out operating at a loss. Firms must therefore either increase
prices or decrease costs.
23. The phrase "allocation of resources" refers to the manner in
which the labor and capital in the economy are employed and invested.
24. THE ROLE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXEs IN THE FEDERAL REVE-
NUE SYSTEMS, A CONFERENCE 3 (1964). A somewhat different defini-
tion has been adopted by some commentators:
Excise--a hateful tax levied upon commodities, and adjudged
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Since firms operating in perfect competition cannot increase
price,25 they must concentrate on reducing costs. Since costs
rise as the quantity of output is increased,20 the first reaction
to the imposition of an excise tax may be a reduction of output
in an effort to reduce costs to the point where amounts paid to
resource owners, when added to the tax, will equal total reve-
nues. A reduction by each individual firm of its output will
soon be reflected in a reduction of industry wide production. As
this takes place, the marginal utility of each unit of the now de-
creased quantity will increase and consumers will be willing
to pay a higher price per unit.2 7 Accordingly, while the imposi-
tion of an excise tax will not in itself increase consumer de-
mand,28 it will induce firms to reduce the quantity of output in
order to reduce costs which in turn will cause consumers to bid
up the price of the more scarce commodity. Firms and consum-
ers will, to use Walras' phrase,2 grope back to the point where
the new and higher price (which represents the value to con-
sumers of the new and smaller quantity) which, when added
to the tax, will equal the new and lower cost of producing the
new and smaller quantity of output.3 0
It is logical to conclude that an excise tax distorts the allo-
cation of resources. The preceding discussion demonstrates that
not by the common judges of property but wretches hired by
those to whom excise is paid.
Samuel Johnson
25. See note 4 supra.
26. See note 5 supra.
27. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra. Two responses are
likely. As the quantity available decreases, some consumers who did
not value the commodity highly will simply discontinue its consump-
tion. Others will discontinue the least important uses (in terms of
capacity to yield satisfaction), but will pay a higher price rather than
discontinue all uses. The net effect will be that the higher price paid
for the lower quantity will represent a higher value to consumers.
28. It is possible that consumer demand for some commodities is
wholly "inelastic;" that is, consumers will pay any price for the same
quantity of output. This unusual case and the case of the wholly
"inelastic" supply are not considered here.
29. WATSON, supra note 2, at 274.
30. As Samuelson puts it:
A tax will raise the price to the consumer and lower the price
received by the producer, the difference going to the govern-
ment. At the higher price a smaller quantity will be
bought by consumers. This is as it should be, because produc-
ers are also supplying a smaller quantity at the lower price
which they receive. Thus the amounts willingly bought and
sold out balance where the new supply and demand schedules
intersect, and there will be no further change in price.
SAMJEsoN, supra note 7, at 368. See generally STiGLER, supra note 3,
at 183-84; WATSON, supra note 2, at 251-52.
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resource allocation is optimized when producers receive the
amount consumers are willing to pay for their good or service.
It also demonstrates that firms can serve as the conduit through
which these payments flow from consumer to resource owner.
But an excise tax intervenes between the resource owner and
consumer, thereby preventing the resource owner from receiv-
ing the full amount paid by consumer. Importantly, the tax
will intervene only in the taxed sector, leaving the untaxed sec-
tor undisturbed. Whereas before the tax, firms in both sectors
were equating the amount paid for productive resources with
the price the firms received for their output, only the untaxed
firm will be doing so after the tax is imposed. Thus, the prod-
uct value to consumers for each dollar's worth of capital used
in the taxed sector will be greater than each dollar's worth
of capital used in the untaxed sector.31 Consumer welfare
therefore could be increased if productive resources moved from
the untaxed to the taxed sector. However, since costs will have
been increased in the taxed sector, firms producing there will
not seek to hire additional resources. This distorting effect is
called an "excise tax effect."
2. Factor Tax Effect
A factor tax will mean here a tax which is imposed on the
return to one, but not all, resources and which is imposed in one
or more, but not all, industries.3 2 A corporate income tax is
probably such a tax. It is imposed on the return to capital but
not on the return to labor and is, of course, imposed only in the
corporate sector. This conclusion is central to the subject at
hand and will be examined more fully below. Perhaps a clearer
example would be a tax which is withheld from wages paid
only by firms producing certain commodities. Such a tax meets
the description of a factor tax since it need not be withheld from
the return to owners of capital and is not imposed on firms
which are not producing the commodities in question.
Both the level of a firm's output and the proportions in
which it uses labor and capital will be affected by a factor tax,
for a factor tax affects not only the quantity of output but the
techniques of production as well. A factor tax's effect on the
level of output is the same as that of an excise tax. Like an ex-
31. WATSON, supra note 2, at 94-96.
32. Such a tax might be called a "one industry factor tax" or a
"one sector factor tax" since the above definition covers only taxes on
the return to factors used in less than the entire economy.
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cise tax, a factor tax increases the firm's total costs. For the
reasons set forth in the discussion of an excise tax, a factor tax
will, therefore, reduce output in the taxed sector. Unlike an
excise tax, however, a factor tax increases the cost of using one
productive resource (e.g., labor) but does not increase the cost
of using the other. Since labor will not be willing to accept
a lower after tax return in the taxed sector than its untaxed re-
turn in the untaxed sector, firms in the taxed sector, when a 50%
withholding tax is imposed, will be required to double the total
amount paid for the use of each unit of labor. However, the
tax will have had no effect on the cost of capital. Both taxed
and untaxed firms must use capital and labor in such ratios
that their costs are directly proportionate to their contribu-
tion to production. Since the cost of labor now has doubled for
the taxed firm, it must increase the ratio of capital to labor until
the law of diminishing returns causes the productivity of capi-
tal to decline (and the productivity of labor to rise) to the
point where the costs of capital and labor are once again propor-
tionate to their productivity.
It is apparent that (1) the quantity of production in the
taxed sector will decline as a result of the imposition of the
tax, and (2) firms in that sector will be using far more capital
intensive techniques of production. Labor will be much more
productive in the taxed than in the untaxed sector so that total
productivity in the economy thus could be increased by shifting
labor from the untaxed to the taxed sector. However, as a re-
sult of the increased cost of using labor in the taxed sector,
firms will have no incentive to make such changes despite the
beneficial effect the changes would have on the economy as a
whole.
III. UNITED STATES CORPORATE INCOME TAX
The next question is to determine the effect of the corporate
income tax in the United States. Specifically, does this tax have
an excise tax effect, a factor tax effect or, perhaps, some third
effect yet to be identified?
Most who are familiar with the corporate income tax in
the United States probably would conclude instinctively that it
is a factor tax. The tax, of course, is imposed only in the cor-
porate sector thereby satisfying one criterion of a factor tax.
In addition, it appears to be imposed on the return to capital
owners but not to labor owners; it is imposed on and reduces cor-
porate profits; corporate profits are accumulated for the benefit
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of, or are paid to, shareholders; everyone knows that sharehold-
ers are capitalists.
Although generally sound, this reasoning is deceptively sim-
ple. As noted, a corporate tax reduces corporate profits and
thereby reduces the earnings of shareholders. As will be seen
below, the important feature of the corporate income tax is not
only that it reduces the amount of shareholder earnings, but
that it is measured by this amount as well. For present pur-
poses, however, it is sufficient to note that the tax reduces share-
holder earnings.
What does this have to do with the productive resource
capital? In the preceding sections the terms "labor" and "cap-
ital" have been used to describe productive resources, and when
used in this sense, the terms usually bring to mind men and
machines. 33 The answer lies in part at least in the fact that
shareholders supply more than money. To be more specific,
shareholders supply the time value of money. That is, they
permit firms to use their money over periods of time without
charging interest. The time value of money is the means by
which physical capital (as distinguished from money capital)
is acquired.34 A plant, machine or tool must be purchased be-
fore, and often long before, the revenues it generates will be at
hand. In the interim, the firm must have money invested in the
productive asset. The time value of money serves as the bridge
between payment for physical capital and realization of the rev-
enues it will eventually produce.
There are a number of items that a non-economist might not
consider capital goods but which require firms to tie up money
for periods of time. Inventories of supplies (growing timber is
an extreme example), or finished products (aging wine) may
tie up quantities of the time value of money that exceed that
invested in machines or tools in an industry. Economists, how-
ever, categorize these items as capital. For example, Professor
Samuelson describes capital this way:
33. In a leading article on the incidence of the corporate income
tax, Chicago's Professor Harberger states:
In the very short run, the [corporate income] tax will neces-
sarily be borne out of the earnings of fixed capital equipment
in the affected industry [i.e., the corporate sector] ....
Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL.
EcoN. 215 (1962).
34. It was Marx's failure to recognize the contribution to produc-
tion of the time value of money (as distinct from depreciation of
physical capital) that led to his conclusion that capitalists were re-
ceiving more than they were contributing and were therefore exploiting
labor. K. MARX, CAPITAL 95 (Modern Library ed. 1932).
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Capital goods consist of a great variety of things: machines of
various kinds, plants and houses, tools, raw materials and goods
in process (seed grain, growing wheat plants, harvested wheat,
flour, dough, warm loaves, wrapped and delivered bread), and
canned and frozen edibles.35
A prominent example of an asset that may tie up vast quanti-
ties of the time value of money is land. While the traditional
definition of capital is limited to produced assets, as distinct
from natural assets,36 there is a current trend towards including
land as capital.37
For now, it is sufficient, and important, to note that in the
context of the corporate income tax, the term "capital" includes
all assets which represent the investment of the time value of
money, and this includes assets which may have been produced
entirely through the use of labor. Similarly, "capital intensive"
techniques of production are those involving the intensive use
of the time value of money. It is still accurate to conclude that
the use of a high proportion of plant, machine and tools per unit
of labor is a capital intensive technique of production, but it
must be kept in mind that holding substantial inventories of
supplies and finished goods can be similarly described. Firms
use capital when it appears that its use will increase produc-
tion. Ignoring debt, a firm will obtain the time value of money
made necessary by use of capital from its shareholders. The as-
sets it acquires with these funds (a tool or aging wine) will in-
crease the firm's productivity, thereby providing additional reve-
nue with which the firm can compensate its shareholders. In
short, the time value of money becomes the means by which
the firm obtains the use of such items of physical capital as
tools or machines; the use of the tools or machines enables the
firm to increase productivity; the revenues from this increased
productivity become the compensation to the shareholders; con-
sequently, a tax on the return to shareholders is a tax on the
compensation paid for supplying physical capital.
Earlier it was suggested that it is not just that the return
to shareholders is reduced by the corporate income tax that
is important, but rather that the tax both reduces and is mea-
sured by that return. A corporate income tax will reduce the
return to shareholders simply because it reduces after tax prof-
its, and this is, after all, the source of the return to sharehold-
ers. However, the same is true of a number of taxes. For ex-
35. SAzmLSON, supra note 7, at 719.
36. See, e.g., SAMUELSoN, supra note 7, at 46.
37. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 2, at 158.
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ample, before a firm can fully adjust to an excise tax, it too
will reduce the firm's after tax profit and thus the return to
shareholders. This does not mean, however, that the two taxes
are the same. The measure of the tax is important because it
determines the effect of the tax on the cost of labor or capital.
A tax measured by the amount paid to labor (e.g., a with-
holding tax on wages) increases the cost to the firm of using
labor but not capital. A firm subject to such tax, for example,
could double the amount paid for the use of capital without
increasing the amount of tax. Whereas, if it doubled the amount
paid labor it would double the tax as well. By like reasoning,
a tax, such as a corporate income tax, which is measured by the
amount paid to, or set aside for, the use of capital will increase
the cost of using capital but not labor. Finally, a tax such as
an excise tax which is measured by the value of goods or services
sold will leave the costs of using labor or capital unaffected al-
though it will increase total costs-or reduce total revenues,
which is the same thing.
The immediate effect of all three taxes might be to reduce
corporate profits and, therefore, the amount paid to or set aside
for shareholders. An employer who is subject to a withholding
tax might not reduce wages by the amount of the tax for fear
of losing its employees. Similarly a firm subject to an excise
tax might not raise the price of the goods or services it sells for
fear of losing its customers. But when the firm seeks to adjust
to the tax, it must look to its measure to determine whether it
has increased the cost of using either labor or capital. If either
is increased the firm must change the ratio in which these fac-
tors of production are used in order to re-establish equality be-
tween the cost of each factor and its contribution to the value
of production.
It may be objected that this analysis simply proves that
a corporate income tax is a factor tax affecting the cost of capi-
tal by a scrambled redefinition of terms: First, see what produc-
tive processes are affected by the corporate tax (those using the
time value of money), define those as capital, and then observe
with amazement that the tax is a factor tax affecting the cost
of capital. But the important conclusion is that the corporate
income tax changes both techniques of production and the quan-
tities in which goals and services are produced. The fact that
affected capital intensive techniques or production include such
processes as aging wine does not detract from the conclusion that
these and other capital intensive productive techniques are made
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more expensive by the tax so that firms in the corporate sector
are induced to favor more labor intensive techniques of pro-
duction.
Some economists have concluded on the basis of statistical
studies that corporations are able to "shift" the corporate income
tax to consumers. That is, due to noncompetitive conditions
firms are able to raise prices by the full amount of the corporate
tax. Indeed, one study indicates that firms shift 135% of the
tax.38 While at first it might appear that the ability of firms
to recoup the entire amount of tax through increased prices will
destroy the tax's effect as a factor tax, this is probably not the
case. Even if a firm can increase its revenues by an amount
equal to its corporate income tax liability, it should continue
to employ capital and labor in such proportions that the contri-
bution to the value of production by each equals its cost to the
firm.
Consider, for example, a monopoloid firm whose manage-
ment has concluded that its salaries are tied more closely to the
volume of sales than the level of profit. Before imposition of
the tax, this firm will be generating profits equal to the amount
its shareholders can realize from alternative investments of like
risk. Thereafter, the firm will use its monopoloid position to
maximize the volume of sales. The imposition of a 50% corporate
income tax will reduce the return to shareholders by one half.
The firm can (assumed here that it will) immediately adjust
prices upward, thereby shifting the tax forward to consumers.
There will be some pyramiding-50 cents of every dollar raised to
offset $1 of tax must itself be paid as tax so that revenues must
then be increased by an additional 50 cents etc.--and the in-
creased prices may lower the total volume of sales. Nevertheless,
the firm can, if it so chooses, limit its response to the tax to in-
creasing prices until the after tax rate of return to capital is
once again at its pretax level so that the tax appears to be borne
solely out of increased revenues.3 9
38. See R MUSGRAVE & M. KIzYzANItx, THE SH-r-G oF = COR-
PORATION Iwcourm TAx (1963). The appropriateness of the data chosen
to establish this conclusion has been questioned. P. Mieszkowski, Tax
Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution of Income,
8 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1103 (1970).
39. If the increased price reduces demand and thus output, the
tax can be said to have been shifted in part "back' onto labor and
capital in that less of these factors of production will be employed by
the firm. This response to the facts is similar to the industry wide
response to an excise tax in a competitive industry. The latter is
discussed in this Appendix at Part II A 1 supra.
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If that is the firm's sole response to the tax, the tax will not
have the factor tax effect of changing the proportions in which
the firm uses labor and capital. But should this be the firm's
sole response? Clearly not. Before the tax the firm was using
labor and capital in such proportions that any increase or de-
crease in the amount paid shareholders or laborers by $1
would increase or decrease revenues by $1. But for every dol-
lar the firm now pays capital, it must also pay $1 in tax. Ac-
cordingly, if it decreases the amount paid shareholders by $1, it
will also decrease its tax liability by $1. Consequently, the
firm can substitute two units of one productive resource (i.e.,
an amount of labor costing $2) for each unit of the other re-
source (i.e., an amount of capital for which shareholders will
be paid $1), thereby increasing production without increasing
cost. Presumably, a management committed to maximizing
sales will do so, for what could be more likely to induce a sales
maximizing firm to take action than the ability to increase the
volume of output without increasing total costs?
In short, if a firm regards the maximization of sales as a
worthwhile goal, it can be expected to pursue this goal syste-
matically, in which case it will change the ratio of capital to
labor in response to the tax. If a firm is simply trying to
avoid excess profits in order to escape antitrust charges or to
avoid attracting competition, and if any method of keeping
profits down (including the inefficient use of resources) will
suffice, tax neutrality becomes a dead word. On the other hand,
if it is assumed that firms pursue their objectives rationally
and systematically, the ability to shift a tax forward in the form
of higher prices does not prevent the tax from becoming a factor
tax.
IV. SUMMARY
The proposition that considerations of consumer welfare re-
quire the mechanisms for taxing foreign income to be used in a
manner which achieves tax neutrality loses some of its persua-
siveness when it is realized that the corporate income tax is
probably not neutral. This is particularly so when it is realized
that most investment of capital abroad takes place in the cor-
porate sector so that the present system probably is biased
against foreign investment.40  Under these circumstances, pro-
40. Within the corporate sector, there may be a bias in favor of
investments in countries where the cost of labor is substantially less
than it is in the United States. As noted, the corporate tax induces
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ponents of tax neutrality will probably have to be content if
the system of taxing foreign and domestic income does not cre-
ate additional distortions which influence the choice between in-
vesting in United States or abroad. Hereafter, it will be as-
sumed that the objective is to equalize the cost of capital em-
ployed by corporations in the United States with its cost when
employed by corporations abroad.
United States tax laws rely principally upon the foreign
tax credit provisions to achieve neutrality between domestic and
foreign investment. The Internal Revenue Code allows a domes-
tic4 ' corporation a credit for certain foreign taxes imposed on
income received from foreign sources. The credit may be used
to discharge the corporation's liability for United States cor-
porate income tax 42 and directly reduce the amount of tax
payable to the United States.43 The credit is allowed only if the
foreign tax is an "income, war profits, [or] excess profits tax"
or a tax imposed "in lieu of a tax on income, war profits, or
excess profits otherwise generally imposed by any foreign
country . . ."44 If the objective is to neutralize the foreign
tax and thereby equalize the cost of using capital abroad with
its cost when used in the United States, it might seem strange
that only income taxes qualify for the credit. Should not any
tax that may distort resource allocation be eligible for credit?
Yes and no. As the following demonstrates, a foreign tax should
be eligible for credit if it is smaller than the United States cor-
porate tax but not if it is larger, unless it has a factor tax ef-
fect identical to that of the United States corporate income
tax.
Consider the following example. Assume that Indonesia im-
poses a production tax equal to 20% of a firm's gross income for
which the United States allows a credit. If this tax is smaller
firms to use more labor intensive techniques of production than would
be used in the absence of the influence of the tax. It would seem to
follow that under these circumstances the cost of obtaining a unit of
labor would be of greater significance to a firm than it would be if less
labor were used so that there would be a greater inclination to seek the
services of cheaper labor abroad.
41. A domestic corporation is one "created or organized in the
United States or under the law of the United States or any State or
Territory." IRC § 7701 (a) (4).
42. IRC §§ 901-06.
43. A deduction reduces taxable income and therefore the amount
of tax by 50%-assuming a 50% rate. A credit is twice as valuable
since it reduces the amount of tax itself. Taxes which are not eligible
for credit may be taken as deductions. IRC § 164 (a).
44. IRC §§ 901 & 903.
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than the United States corporate income tax, the sale of one
unit more or less of output brings a firm the full price consumers
pay for the unit of output, since any increase or decrease in
production tax will be wholly offset by an increase or decrease in
the credit. Allowance of a credit therefore permits the firm to
ignore the production tax completely. Conversely, if the pro-
duction tax is the larger of the two, the sale of one unit more
or less of output will net the firm the price less the production
tax. The reason is that since the production tax already exceeds
the income tax, the additional tax credit resulting from the ad-
ditional production tax has no income tax against which it can
be applied. Consequently, the additional production tax simply
constitutes an additional cost to the firm. Similar reasoning can
be used to show that only the larger tax will be considered by
a firm when it is determining the relative cost of capital and
labor. It follows that a credit for such a tax is not neutral if it
is larger than the corporate income tax.
